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Two leading schools of thought among U.S. conservative legal elites—
Law and Economics (L&E) and Originalism and Textualism (O&T) —both 
purport to use their formalist structures to guide analysis in ways that are 
objective, substantially determinate, and apolitical. Because they rest on very 
different theoretical underpinnings, L&E and O&T should only randomly 
reach similar policy or legal conclusions. After all, L&E implements 
neoclassical economics, a theory of utility maximization, whereas O&T is a 
theory of semantics. Yet as practiced, L&E and O&T rarely result in conflict. 
What explains the missing intra-conservative clash? Despite their respective 
pretenses to objectivity, determinacy, and political neutrality, neither theory 
delivers on its promises. Economic efficiency, the linchpin of L&E, is incoherent 
because it relies on typically hidden but ultimately normative assumptions 
about preferences that would exist in an impossible world without law. O&T as 
it has been refined in response to devastating criticisms of earlier versions is 
indistinguishable from ostensibly less determinate rivals like Living 
Constitutionalism and purposivism. Accordingly, conservatives use L&E and 
O&T to obscure the role of normative priors, perhaps even from themselves. 
Liberals could use the same techniques for different results but heretofore 
generally have not, instead mostly settling for counterpunching against charges 
of result-orientation.
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I.  Introduction 
 
 The Republican-controlled Senate’s 2018 confirmation of Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh and numerous like-minded lower federal court judges shifted the 
federal judiciary’s ideological center of gravity to the right.1 Depending on 
electoral outcomes, the balance could shift back, but for the medium term, the 
most important lines of division may not be between liberals and conservatives 
but between differing conceptions of legal conservatism. 
One need not look very far to find intra-conservative differences. Justice 
Clarence Thomas emphasizes original meaning more than precedent.2 Justice 
Samuel Alito has expressed admiration for Burkean conservatism,3 which 
could suggest a somewhat greater role for precedent.4 Justice Scalia had a civil 
libertarian streak in criminal procedure cases,5 and Justice Gorsuch might be 
exhibiting the same tendency.6 Chief Justice John Roberts clearly values the 
                                               
1 In less than three years in office, President Trump had named one in four active judges 
on the federal appeals courts. See Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court Judges is now 
a Trump Appointee, WASH. POST. (Dec. 21, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/one-in-every-four-circuit-court-judges-is-now-a-
trump-appointee/2019/12/21/d6fa1e98-2336-11ea-bed5-880264cc91a9_story.html. 
2 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study 
of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 563 (“Justice Thomas, by contrast 
[with Justice Scalia], has shown some disregard for stare decisis and proudly claimed that 
originalism should trump precedents.”). 
3 See Steven G. Calabresi & Todd W. Shaw, The Jurisprudence of Justice Samuel Alito, 87 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 507, 553–577 (2019) (describing “the Burkean jurisprudence of Justice 
Alito”). 
4 For a useful explanation of the difference between originalism and Burkean 
conservatism, see Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509 
(1996). 
5 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498–99 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“the 
jury trial guarantee . . . has never been efficient; but it has always been free.”); see also 
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (Scalia, J., for the Court) (reversing a murder 
conviction for a Confrontation Clause violation). 
6 See Ilya Shapiro, A Tale of Two Justices, 2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. ix, x (“Justice Gorsuch 
is rapidly becoming a libertarian darling in many ways—his ‘defections’ tend to be in 
criminal law”). 
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public perception of the judiciary as an apolitical branch,7 which may moderate 
his conservatism. And at least so far, Justice Kavanaugh has aligned himself 
closely with the Chief Justice.8 
Thus, Republican appointees do not comprise a monolithic bloc.9 
Consider the October 2018 Term, in which twenty cases were decided by a 5-4 
margin. Although the most common alignment pitted the five Republican 
appointees against the four Democratic ones, other combinations accounted for 
nearly twice as many cases. Indeed, there were slightly more 5-4 cases in which 
one Republican appointee joined his Democratic colleagues than in which the 
Republican appointees all voted together.10 Cleavages no doubt exist among 
Republican appointees to the lower courts as well. 
Yet to date, we see scant evidence of what ought to be a fundamental 
intra-conservative division—between jurists who subscribe to the law-and-
economics movement (hereafter “L&E”) and those who brand themselves 
originalists in constitutional interpretation and textualists in statutory 
interpretation (hereafter “O&T”). The absence of much conflict is surprising, 
because the two approaches are at best orthogonal and should frequently lead 
to different results. Faced with legal uncertainty, the L&E judge asks what 
legal rule will best promote economic efficiency.11 By contrast, the O&T judge 
will consult dictionaries, corpora, and other sources to discern the original 
public meaning of the relevant legal text.12 Based on their underlying 
theoretical commitments, there is no reason to think that these approaches 
should consistently point to the same result. 
To be sure, courts sometimes acknowledge a conflict. Consider Tennessee 
Valley Authority (“TVA”) v. Hill,13 which just barely pre-dates the rise to 
                                               
7 See Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks 
‘Obama Judge’, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html; 
see also John Roberts, 2019 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (2019), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2019year-endreport.pdf. 
8 See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018: Voting Alignment – All 
Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 28, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19-35-43.pdf. 
9 Neither do the Democratic appointees, but we do not focus on them here. 
10  Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018: 5-4 Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 
28, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_2_19-21.pdf. 
11 See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
509, 512–20 (1980),  
12 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
53–69 (2012). 
13 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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prominence of both L&E and O&T. There the Supreme Court held that the 
Endangered Species Act required the halting of mostly-completed construction 
of a multimillion-dollar dam in order to preserve habitat for a then-recently-
discovered species of fish, the snail darter.14 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for 
the Court sounded themes that we would now associate with textualism as he 
overrode the L&E-style objection that halting the dam’s construction so late in 
the game would cost substantially more than justified by the sum of the 
resulting benefits and that therefore Congress ought to be presumed not to 
have intended that result. He wrote: 
 
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small 
number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of 
species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually 
completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 
million. The paradox is not minimized by the fact that Congress 
continued to appropriate large sums of public money for the 
project, even after congressional Appropriations Committees 
were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the 
snail darter. We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of 
the Endangered Species Act require precisely that result.15 
 
The dissent by Justice Powell followed the path typically taken by L&E-
friendly jurists, acknowledging that if the statutory language were truly 
unambiguous, he would have no choice but to follow it, but then finding 
ambiguity and resolving it in a way that avoided wasting resources.16 
 Cases like TVA v. Hill ought to be common, but they are in fact very 
rare. Instead, just as the Republican Party coalition of social conservatives and 
economic libertarians has remained remarkably stable since Richard Nixon’s 
                                               
14 Congress subsequently overrode the specific ruling. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988). See also 
Jared des Rosiers, Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How the God 
Squad Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (1991). 
15 473 U.S. at 172–73. Contemporary textualists would disapprove of the majority 
opinion’s reliance on legislative history, see id. at 181–84 (discussing, inter alia, committee 
reports), but for present purposes that distinction need not concern us. Here we highlight 
the Court’s view that its role is to discern a statute’s meaning largely independent of the 
costs and benefits of that meaning, which both Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion 
and textualism regard as a policy consideration not suited for courts absent a textual 
command. 
16 See id. at 207–08 (Powell, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 210 (decrying “an interpretation of 
the Act that requires the waste of at least $53 million”). 
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southern strategy realigned the parties,17 so too, for decades the L&E and O&T 
branches of conservative judicial ideology have co-existed. 
Political compromise and horse-trading—in which social conservatives 
get fiery speeches and judges who are supposed to overturn or at least limit 
Roe v. Wade,18 while economic libertarians get deregulation and tax cuts—
mediate the intra-Republican ideological conflict between social conservatives 
and economic libertarians in the political realm. By what mechanisms do legal 
elites reconcile or suppress the substantial potential conflict between L&E and 
O&T? The answer is not immediately apparent. Indeed, it is not even clear that 
key actors—whether conservatives themselves or (to a lesser extent) their 
critics—recognize the tension’s existence. 
 This Article argues that we have witnessed substantially less direct 
conflict between L&E and O&T than one would expect because, despite their 
different foundations, the two approaches closely resemble each other in a way 
that permits conservative jurists to make all-things-considered and 
ideologically laden value choices and then use L&E, O&T, or both to offer post 
hoc rationalizations for those choices. 
L&E is economic formalism. O&T is legal formalism. Both brands of 
formalism purport to be positive rather than normative, objective, and 
apolitical, but both are in fact highly under-determined and thus open to 
manipulation in a way that makes them normative, subjective, and 
ideologically value-laden. A conservative judge can and typically will reach the 
same result using either L&E or O&T, because L&E and O&T function as 
mechanisms for rationalizing results reached on other, unstated and 
normative, grounds. 
Readers of law journals will likely find our claim about legal formalism 
familiar, even clichéd. After all, since at least the early twentieth century, legal 
realists and their heirs have sought to debunk legal formalism. We can assure 
our readers that we will not simply recapitulate (or even cite much of) the vast 
literature that critiques legal formalism. 
                                               
17 See JOSEPH A. AISTRUP, THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY REVISITED: REPUBLICAN TOP-DOWN 
ADVANCEMENT IN THE SOUTH 113–42 (2015) (describing the contemporary legacy of the 
southern strategy). To be clear, we do not contend that Nixon invented rather than 
exploited existing divisions. See id. at 5 (noting how Nixon built on Barry Goldwater’s 
appeal to “strongly ideological, racially motivated, white conservatives” by “melding 
economic conservatives with states’ rights advocates”); DOUG MCADAM & KARINA KLOOS, 
DEEPLY DIVIDED: RACIAL POLITICS IN POST-WAR AMERICA 104 (2014) (characterizing 
“Nixon’s much ballyhooed ‘southern strategy’” as less a top-down creation than “a 
reflection of . . . the racially conservative white countermovement [that emerged] first in 
the South in the early 1960s, but spreading to the rest of the country in the mid- to late 
1960s”).  
18 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Readers might also think they know what we will say to critique L&E—
that it under-values distributional concerns, difficult-to-measure diffuse 
harms (like negative environmental externalities), and other so-called “soft” 
variables. We agree with that line of criticism, but our critique goes deeper. We 
do not simply contend, for example, that practitioners of L&E trade off too 
much equity for efficiency. Our argument—which is not original to us but 
largely unknown even among professional economists and virtually completely 
unknown among lawyers, judges, and legal scholars—is that the very idea of 
efficiency is empty without a highly contestable set of value judgments. 
Skeptical readers might believe they have a reasonably workable 
understanding of efficiency. If you want to move a gallon of water from a spigot 
to your garden, you will think it less efficient to do so by filling a leaky bucket 
than by filling a bucket that does not leak.19 Isn’t that roughly all that 
economists mean when they say that some legal rule is more efficient than 
some other rule—that it results in less waste? Perhaps, but if so, the word 
“waste” hides more than it illuminates. 
Suppose that the framers of a new constitution are trying to decide 
whether the government must prove a person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
in order to obtain a criminal conviction. Let us imagine that the alternative is 
the clear-and-convincing evidence standard. An economist at the constitutional 
convention cites a study showing that going from clear-and-convincing to 
beyond-a-reasonable doubt will increase the number of guilty people who are 
acquitted by more than the resulting decrease in the number of convictions of 
innocent people it will prevent. Thus, the economist says, the rule is not cost-
justified. It is inefficient. 
Is the economist right? The answer depends on the relative weights that 
the constitution writers place on avoiding acquittals of the guilty versus 
avoiding convictions of the innocent. Those who agree with the adage that it is 
better for ten guilty to go free than for one innocent to be convicted will reject 
the economist’s conclusion so long as the ratio of wrongful convictions avoided 
to unjustified acquittals is at least one-tenth. 
In response to our example, one might object that the civil libertarians 
are making a conscious choice to adopt the inefficient rule, but we think that 
objection simply confuses the issue. Whether the rule is efficient or inefficient 
in the first place depends on what counts as waste. That might be easy to 
answer if the choice is between two buckets, one with and one without a hole 
in it, so that the leak dissipates a valuable resource for no countervailing 
benefit. But few choices in life or law look like that. Typically, various rules, 
standards, and procedures will come with packages of costs and benefits. 
                                               
19 We borrow the metaphor of a leaky bucket from Arthur Okun. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, 
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY, THE BIG TRADEOFF 91 (1975). 
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Indeed, whether a particular outcome counts as a cost or benefit will itself often 
be contentious. 
We hope we have said enough so far to overcome the initial skepticism 
of readers who, based on everyday usage of the term “efficiency” or what they 
learned in an introductory economics course, think that efficiency is positive, 
objective, and apolitical. Part II develops and expands the critique of the 
concept of efficiency on which neoclassical economics and thus L&E rest. We 
show how these approaches rely on the false assumption that there exist 
natural baselines against which market “distortions” can be gauged and thus 
efficiency can be judged. 
Part III critiques legal formalism. Unlike L&E, which is indeterminate 
to its core, O&T could, in principle, provide determinate answers, but we 
explain how O&T evolved in recent decades to become indeterminate in 
practice. The differences in principle between L&E and O&T end up being 
much less important than the similarities in how they operate in practice—to 
obscure value judgments behind a mask of objectivity and determinacy. 
Part IV illustrates our thesis in action by examining how leading 
scholars and judges who bridge the L&E and O&T movements have sought to 
reconcile the different sorts of results to which the two approaches should 
routinely lead if their claims to objectivity and determinacy were valid. We 
show how the leading scholars and judges use the very substantial wiggle room 
that L&E and O&T provide in order to suppress contradictions and disguise 
value choices. 
Part V offers and explores several hypotheses to answer the following 
question: Given the open-endedness of the two formalisms we discuss, why 
haven’t liberal-leaning jurists also made extensive use of the rhetorical 
justification structures that are L&E and O&T? Why, in other words, do 
liberals not try to beat conservatives at their own game? 
 
II.  Economic Efficiency is an Inherently Incoherent—and thus 
Manipulable—Concept 
 
The law-and-economics movement features two primary claims to 
legitimacy, each of which depends on and then reinforces the other. The first 
claim is that by striving to maximize efficiency, L&E brings rigor to discussions 
that have heretofore supposedly been riddled with flabby logic and mere 
sentiment. The second claim is that efficiency is an objective and scientific 
concept, thus inoculating L&E adherents against the tendency to substitute 
personal normative priors for cold-blooded logic.20 
                                               
20 See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, State of the Debate: The Chicago Acid Bath, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT (Nov. 16, 2001), https://prospect.org/culture/books/state-debate-chicago-acid-
bath/ (describing and quoting Richard Posner’s foundational work in L&E, noting in 
particular that, “although [Posner] admires the aesthetic accomplishments of art and 
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Both of those claims turn out under scrutiny to be, to put the point 
bluntly, false. This is not to say that everything written under the L&E banner 
is false, of course, but that the claims that the L&E approach is uniquely 
rigorous and objective are simply unsupportable. Why? Because L&E is based 
on neoclassical economic theory, from which it draws not just its methods but 
its pretenses to rigor and objectivity, but with which it shares a fatal reliance 
on an incoherent and ultimately unmoored notion of efficiency. 
As we noted in Part I, the problems with neoclassical economic theory 
that we discuss here (as well as many other problems that, while important in 
further undermining neoclassical theory, are not relevant to the current 
discussion) have been discussed at length among some economists and 
philosophers over the more than half-century since neoclassicism emerged as 
the dominant school of thought in economics departments in the United States 
and elsewhere. In that sense, these critiques are “known” to (some) scholars 
and are thus not novel insights on the part of the current authors. Similarly, 
it would be quite wrong to suggest that legal scholars have been passive in 
pushing back against L&E, with top scholars offering sometimes withering 
criticisms of the by-now dominant approach.21 
However, the most fundamental critiques of L&E and neoclassical 
economics are generally not taught in law schools or even in economics 
departments, where the focus is not on exploring the limitations and internal 
contradictions of the theory but on promoting its supposed explanatory and 
predictive power (as well as, one must note, emphasizing and even celebrating 
the supposedly rigorous math-intensive approach that L&E often adopts). 
Therefore, those critiques of L&E and the neoclassical theory that spawned it 
are known only to the rather small group of scholars who happen to have come 
across them but are not widely known even to many who write with great 
facility and passion about the power of the neoclassical economic/L&E 
approach. 
Our purpose here, then, is to shine a light on the logical incoherence of 
                                               
literature, he believes that morality, for instance, is a tangled mass of taboos that offers 
us no possibility of increased insight. … Posner repeatedly describes his task as ‘providing 
an acid bath’ that washes away ethical taboos and shows human behavior in its elemental, 
economic character.”) 
21 See Guido Calabresi, An Exchange: About Law and Economics; A Letter to Ronald 
Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980).  See also Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and 
Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); Robert Ashford, Socioeconomics and 
Professional Responsibilities in Teaching Law-Related Economics Issues, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 133 (2004); David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest 
Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2011); Neil H. Buchanan, 
Can Economics Get Better, Even Though It Can’t Get Better?, Justia (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2019/12/05/can-economics-get-better-even-though-it-cant-get-
better. 
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neoclassical economics as a theory, concentrating specifically on the pride of 
place enjoyed by efficiency assessments as the sine qua non of acceptable 
economic analysis (including economic analyses of the law). 
We hasten to emphasize, however, that although our discussion in this 
Part necessarily focuses on the aspects of the theory that make it analytically 
incoherent, we do not limit ourselves to saying merely that such incoherence 
makes the L&E approach “no better or worse than” all other necessarily non-
objective approaches. As we will argue, it is worse. 
To be clear, even to demonstrate that neoclassical efficiency analysis 
does not deserve the glow of supposed objectivity that it has long enjoyed is 
quite a lot. As we will emphasize at the end of this Part, however, efficiency-
based analyses are frequently in practice used for ethically repugnant ends. 
Before we get there, however, it is essential to understand why economic 
efficiency is incoherent even on technical grounds. We set aside moral 
considerations to do so, but only temporarily. 
A.  Other Prominent Critiques of Efficiency 
 
Any school of thought as influential as neoclassical economics (and its 
offspring, such as L&E) will of course have come under extended scrutiny, both 
from scholars who reject the new orthodoxy and even from those who might 
end up embracing it. We have no reason, and frankly no interest, in rehashing 
all of those debates, although we do note that this particular orthodoxy has the 
remarkable ability to come out on the short end of virtually all such debates 
but somehow never to “lose” in the sense of being jettisoned due to its flaws. 
We do, however, think it important to clearly set aside two particular 
debates that have raged within the economics and L&E communities that 
might be easy to confuse with our critique, but which are not our focus. 
First, there is an extensive literature discussing the difference between 
two types of efficiency—Pareto efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.22 Pareto 
efficiency is typically described as a situation in which it is not possible to make 
anyone better off without making someone else worse off (where “better off” is 
defined in a very tendentious way, but we digress). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
allows policies to be adopted that make someone worse off so long as the gains 
to the winners exceed the harms to the losers, thus opening a space for policy 
actions that Pareto efficiency seems to foreclose. 
                                               
22 See Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative, and Functional Schools in Law and 
Economics, 18 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 259, 266–68 (2004); compare Daniel A. Farber, 
Autonomy, Welfare, and the Pareto Principle, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
ISSUES AND FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS (Aristides N. Hatzis & Nicholas Mercuro, eds. 
2015) (hereinafter LAW AND ECONOMICS), with Gerrit de Geest, Any Normative Policy 
Analysis Not Based on Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Violates Scholarly Transparency Norms, 
in LAW AND ECONOMICS (2015).  
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There are situations in which it is useful to explore the differences 
between those two types of efficiency, but this is not one of them. Both of those 
definitions of efficiency are based on the same assumptions, and especially on 
the same theory of value (the so-called willingness-to-pay criterion, in which 
value is determined by the amount of money that a person can and will pay in 
an arms’-length transaction). Both claim to be objective and rigorous. Our 
critique undermines both of these conceptions of economic efficiency, which 
means that we need not concern ourselves with the intramural debates about 
which specific version of neoclassical efficiency is in play. They both are. 
Second, there is a possibly even more extensive literature that critiques 
neoclassical approaches to policymaking (including L&E) not by attacking 
efficiency itself but by arguing that efficiency should not be the sole criterion 
in public decision making. This is commonly known as the equity/efficiency 
debate, where some scholars (rightly, in our view) fault the elevation of 
efficiency over concerns about fairness, justice, and so on.23 
Our point here is that the even the critics of efficiency in the equity-
efficiency debate generally do not question whether efficiency has a coherent 
meaning. Instead, they at least tacitly accept the purported power of efficiency 
but argue—often passionately and persuasively—that there are other 
important values that should not be trampled in a rush to make the economy 
more efficient. 
Again, we happen to be deeply sympathetic to such critiques. If 
efficiency were a coherent concept and were as powerful as its proponents 
claim, we still would side with those who say that, for example, income and 
wealth redistribution would enhance social and political (and economic) values 
that are too important to sacrifice at the altar of a heartless and technocratic 
notion of efficiency. 
Yet the equity/efficiency debate’s frustrating tendency for the sides to 
talk past each other is evidence of its fundamentally unsatisfying nature. One 
side says, “Don’t forget about fairness, which has to count for something,” while 
the other side retorts, “Are you saying you want the economy to be inefficient? 
Think with your heads, not your hearts.”24 
Indeed, one of our key points here is to attack the presumption 
underlying the accusation—often accepted on both sides of the debate—that 
                                               
23 For an especially good recent example of this type of analysis, see James R. Repetti, The 
Appropriate Roles for Equity and Efficiency in a Progressive Income Tax, 24 FLA. TAX REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470360). See also DAVID A. 
BRENNEN, KAREN B. BROWN, AND DARYLL K. JONES, BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN 
UNITED STATES TAX LAW (2013) (a collection of essays by scholars arguing in different 
contexts for more focus on equity and less on efficiency).  
24 Cf. ALAN S. BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECONOMICS FOR A 
JUST SOCIETY (1987). 
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those who in any way demote efficiency from pride of place in policy analysis 
are elevating soft values over hard values. As we will demonstrate, there is 
nothing hard-headed about efficiency analysis until one makes contestable and 
ultimately normative baseline assumptions that necessarily predetermine 
where the supposedly objective analysis will lead. 
While we happen to be among those who believe that neoclassical 
economists and L&E scholars are normatively wrong to disparage fairness 
issues, therefore, nothing in our analytical critique here hinges on that belief. 
Indeed, we could be utterly heartless about issues of inequality, poverty, and 
so on, but that would not in any way change our conclusion that efficiency-
based theorizing is incoherent.25 
B.  The Baseline Problem and the Lack of a “State of Nature” 
 
Many readers of this Article might have taken an economics course or 
two as part of their undergraduate studies, while others will surely have run 
across references to “supply and demand” as the basic tool of neoclassical 
economic theory. (Aside: Most people will not, of course, even be aware of the 
modifier neoclassical when thinking about economics. Tellingly, those who call 
themselves economic theorists are now so monolithic in their acceptance of the 
fundamental neoclassical approach that “economic theory” is used as a 
standard synonym for neoclassical economics,26 as if there were only one 
economic theory.) 
Although supply-and-demand curves are merely the graphical 
representation of a paradigm based on rational utility maximization under a 
                                               
25 In this sub-Part we have distinguished the critique we mean to offer from debates over 
which conception of efficiency—Pareto versus Kaldor-Hicks—is preferable and over the 
efficiency/equity tradeoff. We do not mean to suggest that these debates exhaust the 
universe of critiques of neoclassical economics. For example, in recent decades, scholars 
influenced by psychology have challenged the rationality assumption, leading to a school 
of behavioral economics and thence to behavioral law-and-economics. See, e.g., Christine 
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell B. 
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeller 
eds., 2018). To the extent that this or other alternatives to neoclassical economics rest on 
critiques that differ from our own, we need take no position on them, although we do note 
below that we find those critiques to be at best incomplete.  See infra, notes 45 and181. 
26 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY (Paul Streeten trans., 1990). 
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variety of assumptions,27 that ubiquitous approach to understanding 
neoclassical economics is useful in exploring why the concept of efficiency lacks 
a neutral, objective baseline. In Part V, we will discuss and critique the so-
called utility functions that undergird (and are mathematically equivalent) to 
the supply-and-demand curves, but the examples in this Part fit more 
naturally with the formulations with which readers who have taken a basic 
economics course will be familiar. 
1.  Supply, Demand, and Slavery  
 
Supply curves represent the quantities of a good or service that sellers 
would be willing to sell at various prices, while demand curves represent the 
quantities that buyers would be willing to buy at various prices. Under 
standard assumptions, there is one price at which both suppliers and 
demanders are willing to sell and buy the same quantity. For example, if at a 
price of five dollars per widget, sellers would willingly sell one thousand 
widgets and buyers would willingly buy the same number, then we have an 
equilibrium price and quantity. 
More generally, the supply and demand curves intersect at the point 
reflecting the equilibrium price and quantity of the good or service in question, 
as illustrated by the following one and only supply-and-demand graph to which 
we will subject our readers. In this particular graph, supply and demand 
respectively increase and decrease linearly with price, but the key point about 
equilibrium applies to other functional forms as well (that is, for nonlinear 
supply and demand curves). 
                                               
27 See Neil H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire: Feminist Legal Theorists and the Tools of 
Economics, in MARTHA A. FINEMAN & TERENCE DOUGHERTY, FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO 
ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY (2005) (hereinafter Playing with Fire). 
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What is the supposed significance of the equilibrium price and quantity?  
Descriptively, we can say that if the market for widgets is in equilibrium, then 
it will continue to be in equilibrium unless some outside force disturbs it. 
Again, there is a great deal missing from that analysis—for example the 
overlooked fact that the process of reaching an equilibrium must necessarily 
change the equilibrium itself,28 which means that even something called an 
equilibrium is not necessarily stable over time. But setting that rather 
fundamental problem aside, the basic idea is that supply and demand curves 
purport to represent a situation in which there is neither surplus nor shortage, 
because the price mechanism has matched up willing sellers with willing 
buyers in exactly sufficient numbers. 
But why does that matter? The key move in neoclassical economics is 
not merely to describe an equilibrium as stable but as efficient. What does 
efficiency mean in this context? It says that the quantity of goods bought and 
sold maximizes value (again, where value is measured by the willingness and 
ability to pay), which means that all other possible quantities of goods or 
services are inefficient because they do not maximize value thus measured. 
This is the linchpin of neoclassical economics-based critiques of all other 
                                               
28 See Neil H. Buchanan, How Realistic is the Supply/Demand Equilibrium Story? A 
Simple Demonstration of False Trading and its Implications for Market Equilibrium, 37 
J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 400 (2008). 
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approaches to policy. There is a quantity of goods that would maximize the 
value generated by a market for a good or service, which means that anything 
that leads to a different quantity being sold has destroyed value. That is, all 
quantities other than the equilibrium quantity are by construction inefficient. 
If the efficient quantity in each market is determined by where supply 
and demand curves cross, then it becomes rather important to know what 
determines the position of those curves. Demanders have money to buy things, 
preferences about what they like and dislike, and so on. Suppliers have access 
to technology, machinery, labor, and so on. Where do those underlying 
determinants of demand and supply come from? 
If Jane currently has one million dollars in wealth, a salary of $100,000 
per year, and access to many alternatives to any given good, she will decide 
how much of each good to buy. But why do we take those facts to be the natural 
baseline? If it turns out that Jane stole her wealth from Calvin, we are left 
with two options: first, we can say that however Jane came to possess a million 
dollars, she does possess it, so her demand curve is correctly measured using 
that baseline; or second, we could say that the correct baseline is to return the 
million dollars to Calvin, the rightful owner, changing both Jane’s and Calvin’s 
demands (in ways that cannot be presumed to offset each other). 
Crucially, the quantity sold in those two situations will differ (except in 
the truly fortuitous case where the market demand curve changes in perfectly 
offsetting ways after proper ownership is restored). Which one is efficient? 
Both are equilibria based on supply and demand curves, but the equilibrium 
quantities are not the same. 
And what if the notion of ownership is not merely a matter of holding 
dollars as a store of wealth? A more highly educated population (with each 
person owning her so-called human capital) is all but certain to have higher 
demands for some goods and services coupled with lower demands for others, 
compared to a less educated population, because education will cause people to 
make different decisions about (among other things) acceptable risks and 
simply liking or disliking some things more than others. To give some examples 
that admittedly rely on stereotypes, other things being equal, an economy with 
more educated people will likely produce more violins, avocado toast, and 
public radio tote bags, while producing fewer banjos, pork rinds, and tractor-
themed baseball-style hats. More consequentially, better-educated populations 
are more productive, moving supply curves outward. In that case, educating 
people will lead to different measures of efficient outcomes, compared to the 
supposedly efficient outcomes in the pre-educated situation. This 
indeterminacy cannot be resolved merely by saying that the pre- and post-
education equilibria are different, because moving from one to the other 
involves deploying economic resources differently and thus changing the later 
outcome in a particular way that was not foreordained. 
As an especially vivid example of the baseline problem, we can ask what 
happens when the ownership of people themselves is one of the alternatives. If 
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people are legally permitted to enslave other people, the measures of demand 
and supply will reflect the pattern of ownership of people—just as they reflect 
the patterns of ownership of land, physical capital, human capital, and so on. 
A perverse aspect of the efficiency concept is that both slavery and 
abolition can be described as both efficient and inefficient. That is, if the 
baseline is that slavery exists, then ending slavery will move supply and 
demand curves such that equilibria will change. Any changes—increases or 
decreases—are per se inefficient, because overproduction of a good is inefficient 
no less than is underproduction. Therefore, an efficiency-respecting economic 
analysis would disparage abolition, because it would lead to inefficient 
outcomes. 
On the other hand, if slavery is currently banned, a legal change to allow 
slavery would be no less inefficient, because one starts from supply and 
demand curves that exist when all people are free. Allowing people to be 
enslaved (even to sell themselves into slavery at market prices) would shift the 
curves and thus the equilibrium quantities in markets across the economy. In 
direct contradiction to the conclusion of the preceding paragraph, legalizing 
slavery would be inefficient in this view. 
2.  The Legal System and the Baseline Problem 
 
Lest one suspect that we are using slavery merely as an extreme 
example to bring readers around to our point of view, we emphasize that there 
is nothing specific to the example of slavery that drives the conclusion that 
where one starts as a baseline determines what counts as efficient and 
inefficient. We do use slavery for its rhetorical and emotional power, but only 
because one would think that a truly neutral economic theory could at the very 
least distinguish between two such radically different worlds, one in which 
people live free and another in which humans own other humans. That 
neoclassical efficiency theory cannot objectively distinguish the two situations 
is thus telling. 
Even so, we need not rely on the slavery example at all. The problem, 
after all, is that an efficiency assessment can only be carried out after having 
determined what the appropriate baseline positions are for all supply and 
demand curves. One possibility would be to say that where the curves are 
“right now” is the baseline and that policy should not interfere with the 
markets’ efforts to find equilibrium based on today’s baseline. That idea is 
captured in the famous French term laissez-faire (literal translation “let do”), 
in which governments are admonished to “leave it alone”. 
Again, that approach leaves in place whatever unacceptable aspects of 
the baseline happen to have come into existence over time (Jane’s hypothetical 
thievery and actual slavery being only two particularly potent examples). More 
fundamentally, however, virtually all efficiency-based analyses are in the end 
arguments that one or more laws that exist right now need to be changed. Are 
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there minimum wage laws? Standard neoclassical analysis says that those are 
inefficient, because they are part of the problem rather than the baseline. Why 
is that move tolerated, however, when there are so many other things going on 
right now that one could argue need to be changed? Maybe minimum wage 
laws actually move us closer to the correct quantity of labor, if other factors 
have combined to move the supply and demand for labor to inefficient 
positions.  
Moreover, even if one could sustain the argument that minimum wage 
laws are inefficient, analyses of other supposed inefficiencies must take all 
existing supplies and demands right now as their baseline. For example, if one 
is worried about the effects of land-use restrictions in cities on the efficient 
level of housing, we can only know what that efficient level is by reference to 
some baseline. 
Yet any such baseline will be affected by supposed inefficiencies in other 
markets, not just in the market under current inspection. Are we saying, for 
example, that housing supply and demand curves need to be adjusted not 
merely for the existence of housing policies but also of minimum wage laws 
(requiring us to specify what housing demand would be—not what it is—in 
that alternative reality where wages are lower) and for any other inefficiency 
in still other markets? 
Beyond the sheer complexity of such an analysis, our fundamental point 
is that using the right-now baseline is arbitrary, because it allows any analysis 
to select which parts of the world are fundamental to the “true” positions of 
supply-and-demand curves and which are unnatural deviations.29 Put 
differently, even the most avid users of efficiency analysis do not truly believe 
that the right-now baseline is right. Instead, they presume to say which parts 
of the baseline are acceptable and which are not. Minimum-wage laws are said 
to deviate from the right-now baseline even though they exist right now, 
whereas laws authorizing inheritance of substantial fortunes are said to be 
part of the baseline. 
But wait. A proponent of neoclassical economics might admit that the 
right-now baseline is arbitrary but argue that there is in fact a single true 
baseline that could be used to measure efficiency. One might contend that it 
would be efficient to eliminate minimum wage laws, rent control laws, labor 
unions, environmental regulations (at least, those that cannot be justified 
through a “correcting externalities” approach,30 which is itself subject to the 
                                               
29 See Martha T. McCluskey, Deconstructing the State-Market Divide, in MARTHA A. 
FINEMAN & TERENCE DOUGHERTY, FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, 
LAW, AND SOCIETY 156 (2005) (describing how economists make political choices when 
demarcating activity as “inside” or “outside” the market). 
30 See Hans Wijkander, Correcting Externalities Through Taxes On/Subsidies to Related 
Goods, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 111 (1985); see also Vidar Christiansen & Stephen Smith, 
Externality-Correcting Taxes and Regulation, 114 SCAND. J. ECON. 358 (2012). 
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baseline problem), and every other item on the American conservative policy 
agenda. Once there, we would supposedly have achieved the elusive natural 
baseline. 
There are two fatal problems with that approach, however. First, 
because of the interaction of all of the current laws and other factors that 
underlie equilibria in different markets, it is possible that a single intervention 
could move us in the inefficient direction. For example, suppose that the true-
baseline analysis would show that it would be efficient to have 1,000 single-
family rental units in a neighborhood, but the current equilibrium quantity 
(due to “distortions”31 in any number of other markets) is 1,200. Abolishing 
rent controls is typically described as removing an arbitrary barrier preventing 
landlords from bringing more units onto the market, eliminating an artificial 
shortage. But doing so here moves us further away from the efficient level of 
1,000 units, not toward it. 
The true-baseline approach, then, requires that all deviations from that 
baseline be corrected simultaneously. Otherwise, incremental interventions 
can make matters worse from an efficiency perspective, not better.  
The second difficulty, however, exposes the deeper problem with 
efficiency analysis. In response to our discussion in the previous two 
paragraphs, a believer in efficiency analysis might say: “It might not be 
realistic to think that we could fix all of the inefficiency-creating problems in 
our system, but at least we know what the proper baseline is, and that is to 
have the government stay out of economic affairs. Laissez-faire is, at least in a 
theoretical sense, efficient.” 
We set aside here the abandonment of any pretense of practical 
applications of an approach that otherwise prides itself on its hard-nosed 
realism. We still must ask, however, what that set of laws would be that 
constitutes our true, natural baseline. “Having the government stay out of the 
way” is ultimately simply not possible—even for those whose dearest wish is 
for the government to go away—as we discuss in more detail presently in the 
next sub-Part. 
C.  Infinite Varieties of Government Minimalism as a Baseline 
 
The most extreme forms of libertarianism admit that there is some bare 
minimum level of government intervention—a so-called Night Watchman 
                                               
31 See Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to 
Government Policy, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159, 167 (warning against the 
“distortionary cost of redistributive taxation.”). Note the loaded language by which 
everything that deviates from true-baseline efficiency measure is described as a distortion, 
not merely a different level of output. By implication, only one situation is undistorted. 
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state32—that is necessary and thus ultimately efficiency-enhancing (in the 
narrow neoclassical sense). But the hope that one can shrink the government 
to the bare minimum size is based on a misunderstanding of the inherent 
involvement of government policy choices that must be made to allow an 
economy to exist in the first place. Put differently, the bare-minimum approach 
to government ignores the reality that determining baselines is radically 
underdetermined even when one requires the government to do as little as 
possible. 
All economic transactions will be negotiated and consummated in the 
shadow of a legal regime that creates and enforces laws relating to property, 
contracts, torts, crime, and so on. Looking at any of those areas of law quickly 
reveals that there is no such thing as a no-government baseline, because the 
government of necessity sets the baseline. 
More importantly, there is not even a single way to meaningfully claim 
to minimize the government’s involvement, because the necessary rules 
governing economic transactions cannot be measured under a single 
“government interference” metric and then totaled. Consider just a few 
baseline questions that arise in property law. 
Will the property system have a rule of adverse possession? We know 
that some jurisdictions allow adverse possession not as a big- or small-
government choice but based on other factors. Even if someone said, “Change 
your property laws to be minimally intrusive,” it is not possible to say which 
choice (allowing adverse possession or not) involves “the government that 
governs least.” 
Similarly, does the government have a patent system? If so, do patents 
expire in 14 years, 20 years, 75 years, or never? Which of those is the 
government-minimizing choice? A government that decides simply to stay out 
of the business of issuing patents is arguably doing less than is required by a 
Night Watchman approach, because such a government could be said to be 
refusing to protect people’s intellectual property. Certainly, a government that 
refused to create and enforce property and criminal laws regarding theft would 
be doing far more (or less) than simply “staying out of people’s way,” because 
people and the businesses in which they work expect to be able to know what 
is theirs and under what conditions ownership can be alienated. Why buy 
goods if doing so does not confer legally enforceable ownership? 
We will mention here, without elaboration, the questions raised by 
inheritance. What is the government-minimizing set of laws there? What is the 
natural baseline for having unearned property change hands at death? If the 
answer is anything other than unfettered inheritance (with its attendant anti-
                                               
32 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974). 
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democratic ills33, along with effects on supply and demand curves), what 
limitations on inter vivos giving follow naturally?  
These are not even a handful of examples drawn from an unlimited 
range of choices that a government must make in setting up its property laws. 
What about contract law? There must obviously be a government that sets up 
and enforces contract laws, so zero-government is again impossible. And as 
above, it is meaningless to say that the choices that one makes about, say, 
whether to use offer/acceptance/consideration, promissory estoppel, or an all-
promises-are-enforced-under-all-circumstances approach to contract law can 
be described as exhibiting different degrees of government intrusiveness in the 
economy. 
The same can be said regarding specific performance versus money 
damages (and the choice among expectation, reliance, or restitutionary 
damages). Is the substantial performance doctrine an example of smaller 
government (because it reduces the number of times that the government’s 
courts order a party to do something that she would prefer not to do) or larger 
government (because it requires a government employee to determine when 
“good enough is enough”)? Endless variations on these questions are inevitable, 
because there must be contract law rules or standards for every situation. 
Although we could provide myriad examples from tort law, criminal law, 
and so on, we hope that what we have provided here suffices to make the more 
general point that there is no single set of laws that constitutes the bare 
minimum, laissez-faire approach to governing. 
Given that there is no bare minimum, different sets of seemingly 
minimalist laws are defensible as the baseline, and each set will generate its 
own unique supply-and-demand curves for goods and services. A society with 
no inheritance tax will produce more yachts than one with a substantial such 
tax; a society with slavery will produce more manacles than one without it; etc. 
Every baseline looks inefficient from the perspective of any other baseline, and 
every set of laws can be a baseline that tautologically determines that it is 
efficient. 
Two legal philosophers, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, have focused 
on what amounts to an application of the baseline problem that bedevils L&E: 
how the lack of a baseline set of laws undermines the familiar libertarian claim 
that taxes are theft.34 They readily acknowledge that they did not suddenly see 
a hole in neoclassical theory that no one had seen before, but they did find it 
                                               
33 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 54 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., 1835) (arguing that America was a uniquely democratic society due to 
its abandonment of primogeniture, resulting in “[t]he last trace of hereditary ranks and 
distinctions [being] destroyed.”). 
34 LIAM B. MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 
(2002). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553508
A Tale of Two Formalisms 
  19 
useful to explore how a tax system can be analyzed when there is no single 
baseline against which to measure all government action. 
Their conclusion—which is not really an argument but rather a simple 
statement of the inexorable logic of the broader baseline problem—is that it 
makes no sense to say that there is a coherent category of pretax income, 
because a government must exist in order to create the laws by which market 
transactions take place, but the government itself must be funded by some kind 
of taxes. 
Notably, even if there were a single baseline in all other areas of law 
that represented a minimized government as a matter of size and expenditures 
(which we demonstrated above is impossible) there would still be infinite 
latitude in determining what and whom to tax in order to raise the money 
necessary to fund even that very small government. People will of course hope 
that the government will make choices that allow them to maximize their after-
tax income, but saying that what the government decides to tax was “my 
income” and thus that taxation is theft ignores the fact that no one would be 
able to earn that income if there were no government to make and enforce the 
rules of commerce. 
This conclusion does not, of course, mean that people’s pretax income 
belongs to the government in some metaphysical, normative, or any other 
sense. It means, instead, that no one can say how much money they would earn 
if there were no government, because there can be no income from economic 
transactions without the legal framework that governments provide. This 
point holds true even for a very small government, because that government 
would have to fund itself through one or more of a variety of taxes (even if 
labeled “fees”), and there is no small-government argument that proves that 
any individual’s particular sources of income are never to be taxed (while 
others can be). 
Again, the Murphy/Nagel framework is properly seen as a subcategory 
of what we are calling the baseline problem. There are no neutral, objective 
laws that deserve primacy in determining what should count as the baseline 
for determining efficiency; and in the tax area, the seemingly much more 
narrow question of how to fund any given size of government turns out to be 
much broader than it initially appears, because the tax system itself has so 
many moving parts, none of which can be called natural. 
In the end, we are making what is truly not an argument but an 
observation: efficiency in the neoclassical (and thus L&E) sense can only be 
meaningfully measured by reference to a baseline set of laws, but there is no 
single such baseline. Efficiency is not good or bad. It is incoherent. Calling 
something efficient has no content. 
D.  Two Simple Examples 
 
A skeptic might object that we have become lost in abstractions, that 
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surely there is a way to know what the baseline is that does not require us to 
rely on first-order normative judgments. If this were a valid objection, we 
would embrace it, because efficiency as imagined by its proponents could be a 
useful concept (even if still subject to objections like the efficiency/equity 
tradeoff); but the objection is not valid, not even a little. 
Consider a very straightforward, non-theoretical question: What is the 
efficient annual output of sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) in the U.S. market? 
Even before attempting to calculate the answer, how would we set up the 
exercise to determine the efficient level of SUV production? 
As described above, even if we are willing to ignore the effects that 
supposed inefficiencies in one market might have on another (such as the 
effects on the automobile market of laws regulating and even subsidizing oil 
production), we are supposed to determine the efficient level of SUV production 
by asking where the supply and demand curves intersect. As always, however, 
we need to ask what underlies and determines the positions of those supply 
and demand curves. 
We choose SUVs as our example not merely because of their familiarity 
(even ubiquity), but because their very existence is a result of an accident of 
history, or more accurately an unintended consequence of laws aimed to solve 
a different problem. Before the 1980s, there simply were no SUVs.35 There 
were light trucks that were truly work vehicles and not at all intended for non-
business use, and there were passenger cars. The oil crises of the 1970s, 
however, had induced Congress to pass a  law mandating the production of 
vehicles that would use less gasoline.36 (Note that this law can easily be 
described under standard economic analysis as efficiency-enhancing to the 
extent that it functioned like a Pigouvian tax that required people to 
internalize the costs that they were imposing on others through pollution, 
automobile accidents, and so on. It can also, however, be described as an 
inefficient intrusion by government into the automobile market. Take your 
                                               
35 See Alexis C. Madrigal, Why Crossovers Conquered the American Highway, The Atlantic 
(Jul. 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/how-the-
crossover-conquered-americas-automobile-market/374061/ (describing the “SUV craze” 
that took hold in the late 1980s and early 1990s). See also Lawrence Ulrich, S.U.V. vs. 
Sedan, and Detroit vs. the World, in a Fight for the Future, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 
12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/business/suv-sedan-detroit-fight.html. 
Conventional wisdom treats the 1984 Jeep Cherokee XJ as the first real SUV, although 
Chevrolet claims that its 1935 Suburban Caryall anticipated the modern passenger 
vehicle on a commercial truck chassis. GENERAL MOTORS, Chevrolet Invented the SUV in 
1935 and Continues to Build on its Legacy With All-New Trailblazer (Apr. 11, 2018) 
https://media.gm.com/media/vn/en/chevrolet/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/vn/en/
2018/apr/Chevrolet-SUV-heritage.html. 
36 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 § 301, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 
(adding Title V, Improving Automotive Efficiency, to the Motor Vehicle Information and 
Cost Savings Act). 
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pick.) 
Writing the resulting legal standards—known as Corporate Average 
Fuel Efficiency (or CAFE) —presented a design choice for Congress (and an 
implementation choice for the Secretary of Transportation, to whom the law 
delegated rulemaking power).37 Because most gasoline was burned by 
passenger cars, and because light trucks were used in businesses, should there 
be a different CAFE standard for light trucks?  Lawmakers said yes, and the 
SUV was inadvertently born, as automakers rushed to use the lower CAFE 
standard to sell cars that fit the formal definition of light trucks.38 
Our point here is not merely to point out that lawmaking can have 
unintended consequences. We are asking instead how to determine the 
efficient level of SUV production. The supply curve only exists at all because 
the government made a choice decades ago that it did not have to make (but 
for which there was no default baseline).39 
And the demand curve? What, in the state of nature, would be people’s 
baseline preferences for SUVs? Do we take the state of nature to be what it 
was before SUVs even existed, meaning that the efficient number of SUVs is 
zero (no matter what the supply curve looks like)? Do we try to guess what 
current demand would be for SUVs in a world in which they were subject to 
the same CAFE standards as cars? If so, based on what assumptions? Or do 
we simply throw up our hands and say that people’s current preferences—even 
if those preferences have government’s fingerprints all over them—are the 
proper baseline for determining efficiency?40 
                                               
37 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. FUEL EFFICIENCY 
STANDARDS (Jul. 25, 2006), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-
efficiency. 
38 See Robinson Meyer, How the Carmakers Trumped Themselves, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 20, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/how-the-carmakers-trumped-
themselves/562400/. 
39 For analysis of tax policies incentivizing use of SUVs for business purposes, see 
Congressional Research Service, Tax Preferences for Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs): 
Current Law and Legislative Initiatives in the 109th Congress (Apr. 4, 2006) (available at 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32173.html); Carrie M. Dupic, The SUV Tax 
Loophole: Today’s Quintessential Suburban Passenger Vehicle Becomes Small Businesses’ 
Quintessential Tax Break, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 669 (2005). 
40 We first posed these questions about the supply of and demand for SUVs in a draft of 
this Article written before the severe economic contraction resulting from the COVID-19 
pandemic and subsequent public-health measures. The foregoing analysis does not 
account for the resulting dramatic decrease in demand for automobiles (and most other 
manufactured goods). Taking it into account would only further illustrate our point by 
adding complexity along another dimension. In the post-pandemic world, is the efficient 
quantity of SUVs produced measured against a baseline in which demand dropped due to 
the actual state shelter-in-place orders? A hypothetical higher baseline in which no public-
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A skeptical reader might nonetheless object that the SUV example is 
extraordinary, because more typically laws regulate something that 
sufficiently approximates a pre-existing market for us to identify distortions 
relative to a commonsensical background. Fair enough—or not, but we will 
accept the point for the sake of argument. Accordingly, let us consider a 
situation in which a legal rule causes behavioral changes that seem 
unquestionably to be a distortion from what people should and would otherwise 
be doing. 
The basic law school course on income taxation typically includes a 
discussion of the tax treatment of fringe benefits. One leading casebook offers 
an example in which an employer pays an employee’s rent on an apartment.41 
Is that taxable? Yes.42 What if the employer also happens to own an apartment 
building and simply allows the employee to live in a unit rent-free? That, too, 
is taxable, because the employee receives compensation with a fair-market 
value equal to the rent on similar apartments, which must be included in a 
taxpayer’s gross income.43 What if the law were changed to allow the second 
type of fringe benefit—employees living for free in employers’ buildings—to be 
tax-free but not the fringe benefit in the first example (which in substance is 
the equivalent of giving the employee money that she then gives to her 
landlord)? Such a rule could be seen as a recognition that business owners 
might want to use their unrelated buildings in conjunction with the business, 
whereas we might not want to allow employers to reduce tax payments simply 
by giving employees free rent as a partial substitute for salary. 
Yet such a rule would give businesses a reason to own apartment 
buildings, simply to allow them to offer a tax-free fringe benefit to employees 
(and, most likely, to recoup some or all of the tax savings by then reducing the 
employees’ salaries). Some business owners, then, would become landlords 
simply for tax reasons. More apartments would probably be built, and in any 
event the equilibrium price and quantity of apartments would change. Surely, 
that would count as a “distortion” under anyone’s definition, would it not? 
We are not so sure. As we discussed above, there is no reason to think 
that the current supply-and-demand curves for anything, including apartment 
buildings, are where they would be in whatever state of the world might be 
called a neutral or natural baseline. Given how many other laws could be 
changed in the name of efficiency, and especially given reasons to believe that 
the current housing market has too few apartments available (especially for 
                                               
health measures were taken? One in which stricter measures were enacted and kept in 
place longer? Or some other baseline? 
41 JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., INCOME TAXATION 68 (17th ed., 2017). 
42 26 U.S.C. § 61. 
43 Id. 
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lower-income renters), no one can say with any confidence that an increase in 
the number of apartments would not increase efficiency in the neoclassical 
sense, even if it happened as an unintended consequence of a change in the tax 
code that was enacted for some other purpose. 
Even so, it would be possible for a person to say, “It’s crazy to have a tax 
provision that induces non-landlords to become landlords simply to provide a 
fringe benefit to their workers in an unrelated business.” With that, we might 
agree. Note, however, that this conclusion would not be based on any firm 
notion of what counts as efficient in the neoclassical sense but instead on the 
more general intuition that we probably should not change the way people 
behave accidentally by creating tax loopholes.44 
When such an accident happens, however, it might in fact move us to a 
new equilibrium price and quantity that is no less defensible than any other 
equilibrium. Asymmetrical tax treatment of what amount to functionally 
equivalent events (the provision of rent-free housing in employer-owned versus 
non-employer-owned units in our example) might seem intuitively to be bad 
policy on other grounds, but there is no way to know whether it is efficient or 
not. 
Why does all of this matter? Neoclassical economists and L&E scholars 
argue that their policy preferences are efficient and that others’ preferences 
are inefficient.  Their claims of objectivity and neutrality, however, are based 
on the assumption that there is a non-manipulable set of laws that would set 
a single baseline that would determine what is and is not economically 
efficient.45 
                                               
44 The term “accidentally” is important in that sentence. There very well could be good 
reasons to purposefully use the tax code to encourage the construction of low-cost housing 
units. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 252 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42 
(2018)) (creating a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) to incentivize developers to 
provide affordable rental housing units). 
45 The so-called Behavioral Law & Economics movement (many of the adherents of which 
would be likely to describe themselves as policy liberals) has tried to amend the 
neoclassical approach to take account of advances in cognitive theory. We certainly 
understand the appeal of relying upon assumptions about the ways in which actual human 
beings think and make decisions that are more realistic than those that undergird the 
rational actor model. We are also aware, however, that the behavioral version of L&E has 
been (perhaps with some justification) criticized for being too open-ended and ultimately 
nothing more than a series of non-generalizable anecdotes. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, 
Has Behavioral Law and Economics Jumped the Shark? Understanding When a 
Promising Research Agenda Has Run Its Course—And Why It Matters in the Real World, 
VERDICT (Aug. 5, 2013),  https://verdict.justia.com/2013/08/05/has-behavioral-law-and-
economics-jumped-the-shark. 
Our larger objection is that the behavioral approach need not deny the primacy of 
efficiency analysis. In fact, it can be framed as making the analysis “more scientific” by 
updating neoclassicism’s behavioral assumptions. In turn, those purportedly better (or 
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There are, however, infinitely many possible combinations of laws that 
not only differ from each other but that are mutually contradictory in terms of 
how one would assess what is efficient and inefficient in policy analysis. If 
there is no way to determine what is efficient and what is inefficient, then those 
assessments are not merely false but categorically impossible to evaluate. They 
are incoherent. 
As we noted at the beginning of this Part, we do not believe that because 
all claims to efficiency are baseline-dependent they are all thus equally valid 
or invalid. The choice of a baseline can itself be examined and critiqued. The 
standard approaches to efficiency analysis, including L&E, fare poorly when 
so scrutinized, because they tend to rely upon and validate existing injustices 
and inequalities. An approach that, say, rejects as inefficient a proposal to 
provide income supports for the feeding of impoverished children does not 
merely rely on an arbitrary baseline; it chooses as its baseline existing unequal 
endowments and asserts that policies that might change those endowments (or 
at least mitigate their consequences) are—as a scientific matter—wasteful and 
based on mere sentiment. Needless to say, both the choice and the assertion 
can and should be criticized on moral grounds. Nothing in our decision to focus 
here on the analytic incoherence of efficiency analysis should be read to suggest 
that, as typically practiced, it is even amoral, much less morally defensible. 
 
III.  The Manipulability of Originalism and Textualism 
 
This Part argues that O&T as employed by the courts in contested cases 
rarely produces determinate answers and thus chiefly serves to obscure value 
judgments. We begin by explaining what O&T is, how it differs from its chief 
rivals, and why we consider originalism in constitutional interpretation and 
textualism in statutory interpretation together, despite the fact that they rest 
on somewhat different justifications. We then offer grounds for doubting the 
objectivity and determinacy claims frequently made on behalf of O&T. We 
conclude this Part by examining empirical evidence tending to show that 
jurists who claim to practice an O&T approach in fact vote their normative 
priors, unconstrained by ostensible jurisprudential commitments.     
 
A. What are Originalism and Textualism? 
 
Our use of the monikers L&E and O&T throughout this Article may 
suggest somewhat more parallelism than exists. “Law and economics” refers to 
a school of thought that applies neoclassical economic principles to law. There 
                                               
more realistic) assumptions would supposedly allow us to determine efficient outcomes 
more accurately. This approach is obviously quite different from our description of the 
fundamentally incoherent nature of the efficiency concept. We are not saying that 
efficiency is poorly measured; we are saying that it is inherently unmeasurable. 
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are, of course, many different approaches to L&E, but the category itself is 
singular. By contrast, originalism and textualism are formally distinct 
animals. Originalism is an approach to interpreting the U.S. Constitution, 
while textualism is an approach to interpreting statutes. An argument thought 
to justify one might not justify the other, and vice-versa.46 
Nonetheless, we think we are warranted in treating O&T as a single 
category, because as originalism and textualism have evolved over time, they 
have come to offer roughly the same prescription: In interpreting an 
authoritative legal text—whether that text is a constitutional provision or a 
statute47—judges (and others tasked with legal interpretation) should consider 
themselves bound by and should give effect to the original public meaning of the 
words in the authoritative text. 
O&T can be best understood in contrast with two main rivals. One rival 
is intentionalism.48 An intentionalist judge interpreting a statute asks what 
the legislature intended with respect to whatever question the judge must 
decide. Likewise in constitutional cases, an intentionalist—sometimes called 
an intentions-and-expectations originalist—will ask what the framers and/or 
ratifiers of the relevant constitutional provision intended or expected with 
respect to the issue at hand.49 
The other main rival to textualism is purposivism. A purposivist judge 
aims to give effect to the purposes that can reasonably be ascribed to the 
legislature in light of the language of a statute.50 Purposivism need not be, but 
usually is, dynamic in the sense that it allows a judge to give effect to a 
statutory provision in ways that might surprise the legislators who enacted it 
                                               
46 But see Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL 
L. REV. 701 (2016) (questioning conventional arguments for regarding the Constitution as 
calling for special interpretive methods that do not apply to other legal texts). 
47 We do not mean to deny that O&T could be applied to the interpretation of other 
authoritative texts, such as treaties, municipal ordinances, or administrative regulations, 
but we do not consider such domains here. 
48 See, e.g., RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012); Earl M. Maltz, 
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist 
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, 
Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (2005). 
49 See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of 
the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 511 (1988) (distinguishing the framers’ and ratifiers’ 
private intentions, which should not count, from their public intentions, which should). 
50 See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 17 (1998) (a “purposivist judge aims to infer” the reasonable purposes that could be 
attributed to reasonable legislators “and apply them”). 
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or the People at the time of enactment.51 The labels are admittedly a bit 
confusing, because the “purpose” that this approach attempts to determine is 
the purpose that specific words serve in the relevant context, not necessarily 
the drafters’ purposes in writing those words (which, again, is the domain of 
intentionalism). Although purposivism as such does not name an approach to 
constitutional interpretation, so-called Living Constitutionalism is a 
reasonably close analogue to dynamic purposivism. 
In statutory interpretation, intentionalists typically give greater weight 
to legislative history than do purposivists, who downplay but do not entirely 
discount legislative history; by contrast, the complete irrelevance of legislative 
history is a key tenet of textualism. One can find amusing examples of self-
described textualists like Justices Scalia and Thomas concurring in all of a 
colleague’s opinion except for some footnote that cites legislative history.52 
Textualists eschew legislative history because they deem it unreliable as a 
measure of the intentions of the legislature as a whole. Legislative staff may 
have sneaked material into a committee report or a bill’s sponsor might make 
a floor speech that goes beyond the actual text on which the full legislature 
votes. 
The reliability objection does not rule out the possibility that the 
legislature has a single discernible intent; it purports to show only that 
legislative history does not necessarily capture that intent. But textualists—
and to a large extent purposivists as well—typically go further in denying that 
there even is such a thing as a coherent legislative intent. Each individual 
legislator will usually have mixed motives for voting for a law,53 and there is 
                                               
51 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479 (1987). 
52 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (decrying the 
Court’s use of Congressional reports, “unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of 
Congress actually had in mind.”); Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767, 
(2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (critiquing the Court’s reliance on Senate reports: “[e]ven 
assuming a majority of Congress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for 
Dodd–Frank with the same intent, ‘we are a government of laws, not of men, and are 
governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.’”) (quoting Lawson 
v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 459–60 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
53 Writing to explain why he rejected an illicit-motive test in the Establishment Clause 
context, Justice Scalia put the case against ascribing intentions to individual legislators 
this way: 
a particular legislator need not have voted for the Act [which mandated the 
teaching of “creation science” if evolution were taught in Louisiana public 
schools] either because he wanted to foster religion or because he wanted 
to improve education. He may have thought the bill would provide jobs for 
his district, or may have wanted to make amends with a faction of his party 
he had alienated on another vote, or he may have been a close friend of the 
bill's sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed the majority 
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no agreed-upon or obvious way to aggregate the mixed motives of all the 
legislators.54 
Casual critics of O&T sometimes accuse its practitioners of 
inconsistency because they eschew legislative history with respect to statutes 
but look to such materials as the Federalist Papers and James Madison’s notes 
on the 1787 Constitutional Convention to infer the original meaning of the 
Constitution.55 That is a fair criticism, although over the last three decades, 
practitioners and champions of O&T have been increasingly careful to avoid 
relying on such materials for the purpose of ascertaining the subjective 
intentions of the framers and ratifiers, as opposed to the purpose of gleaning a 
sense of how the words in question were used at the time of their adoption. 
Meanwhile, and consistent with the new theory, recent years have witnessed 
expanded reliance on materials that are not specifically law-related—such as 
dictionaries and so-called corpuses that collect period usage—to infer the 
semantic content of words and phrases used in the Constitution at the time of 
their adoption. 56 
                                               
leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and 
make a fund-raising appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to 
vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of 
constituent mail, or he may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he 
may have been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who 
worked on the bill, or he may have been settling an old score with a 
legislator who opposed the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife, who 
opposed the bill, or he may have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated 
when the vote was called, or he may have accidentally voted “yes” instead 
of “no,” or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a 
combination of some of the above and many other motivations. To look for 
the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something 
that does not exist. 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 428–
32 (2005). 
55 See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Supreme Court: ‘Originalism’s’ Theory and the 
Federalist Papers’ Reality, The Atlantic (Jan. 11, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/the-supreme-court-originalisms-
theory-and-the-federalist-papers-reality/69158/. 
56 See Neal Goldfarb, A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning in the Framework of Corpus 
Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1359 (2017) (arguing that corpus linguistics can reveal 
meaning beyond the meaning of individual words); Thomas R. Lee and Stephen C. 
Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 828 (2018) (“Corpus linguists 
draw inferences about language from data gleaned from ‘real-world’ language in its 
natural habitat—in books, magazines, newspapers, and even transcripts of spoken 
language.”). For a skeptical view, see Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning: An 
Experimental Assessment of What Dictionary Definitions and Linguistic Usage Data Tell 
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Yet if practitioners of O&T are increasingly careful to avoid the charge 
of inconsistency, the charge itself raises a question: Why would it be 
inconsistent to treat statutes and constitutional provisions differently? After all, 
the tenets of textualism rest on a particular understanding of how a legislature 
as an institution generates law. That understanding might not apply to the 
processes and institutions that give rise to constitutional provisions. 
For example, as we will explore at greater length in Part IV, some 
scholars and judges justify textualism on grounds of public choice theory, 
which views the legislature chiefly as the site of interest-group bargaining.57 
In this view, statutes reflect compromises, and so the purposivist idea of giving 
effect to a statute’s underlying public-regarding purpose should be rejected. 
There is no such thing as a statute’s public-regarding purpose, public-choice-
inflected textualists say; there is only the aggregation of forces that bear on 
venal legislators seeking re-election by a large enough slice of the rent-seeking 
and otherwise selfish public. Whatever the merits of the public-choice 
argument for textualism, it depends on a particular understanding of 
legislatures and legislation which might not hold (or might not hold to the same 
degree or in the same way) with respect to constitutional conventions, the 
process of constitutional amendment, or constitutional provisions. 
Other justifications for textualism also have limited application with 
respect to constitutional as opposed to statutory interpretation. For example, 
John Manning has argued that textualism should be understood as a 
nondelegation doctrine. By giving legal effect to legislative history, a judge 
improperly allows a subset of Congress—those who write committee reports or 
give floor speeches—to exercise power that belongs to Congress as a whole.58 
Suppose one thinks Manning is right. Even so, his conclusion has no necessary 
implications for constitutional interpretation. The nondelegation doctrine as 
Manning understands it is an implication of the procedure by which Congress 
makes law under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. By its terms, the 
nondelegation doctrine has nothing to say about how to interpret the 
Constitution itself, which is not a product of the Article I, Section 7 process. 
Accordingly, like the public-choice justification, the nondelegation justification 
for textualism does not necessarily apply to constitutional interpretation. 
Conversely, one can identify arguments for constitutional originalism 
that do not automatically translate into arguments for textualism in statutory 
interpretation. Consider the view of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, 
                                               
Legal Interpreters, 133 HARV. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2020), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3266082 (concluding from experiments that both dictionaries 
and corpora have high error rates and frequently disagree with one another). 
57 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 546 (1983). 
58 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 
(1997).  
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who have argued at length that originalism follows from the supermajoritarian 
procedure that was required to create the Constitution and is required to 
amend it.59 Allowing judges to update or change the Constitution based on 
changing social norms circumvents the requirement of a supermajority for 
constitutional change, McGinnis and Rappaport say. Therefore, 
understandings of the Constitution should remain unchanged—that is, judges 
should stick with the original meaning via originalism. Yet even if that were a 
persuasive argument for originalism in constitutional interpretation, it has no 
obvious relevance for statutory interpretation, because statutes require only a 
simple majority for enactment, amendment, or repeal. One could thus be 
persuaded by the McGinnis/Rappaport argument for originalism in 
constitutional interpretation (although, to be clear, we are not thus persuaded) 
but reject textualism in statutory interpretation.60 
And yet we observe that originalism in constitutional interpretation and 
textualism in statutory interpretation tend to travel together. Why? Part of the 
answer is that while some arguments for originalism and textualism do not 
overlap, others do. In particular, two closely related arguments apply to both. 
First, many scholars and jurists think (or at least say) that originalism 
and textualism constrain judicial discretion. In an insightful book review 
published twenty years after the book under review, Manning described what 
he called Justice Scalia’s commitment to an “anti-discretion” principle.61 
Although Scalia championed rules as against standards,62 Manning contended 
that “an insistence upon decisional justifications external to the judges’ will, 
and not a naked preference for rules, provided the central grounding for all of 
Justice Scalia’s commitments,” including textualism and originalism.63 We 
share Manning’s view of Scalia’s motives, but we would add that neither the 
concern about judicial discretion nor the claim that O&T constrains it was 
unique or even special to Justice Scalia. Both the concern and the claim can be 
                                               
59 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Supermajoritianism: 
Defending the Nexus, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1919 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three Views of the Capitol, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1115 (2007). 
60 Accord Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 
75 COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (offering reasons why “constitutional and statutory 
interpretation [should] diverge”).  
61 John F. Manning, Classic Revisited: Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 
115 MICH. L. REV. 747, 749 (2017) (reviewing Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW ((Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)). 
62 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
63 Manning, supra note 61, at 749–50. 
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found prominently in the writings of other self-described originalists and 
textualists.64 
Second, originalists and textualists often claim (at least implicitly) that 
they are simply engaged in ordinary linguistic practice.65 If what it means to 
interpret a text is simply to give effect to the meaning of the words as 
understood by a typical addressee at the time of the making of the statement, 
then a commitment to originalism in constitutional interpretation will go hand 
in hand with a commitment to textualism in statutory interpretation and, for 
that matter, with a parallel commitment in any other linguistic domain. 
To be clear, in pointing to the shared professed concern with judicial 
discretion and the view that real interpretation simply is O&T, we do not mean 
to endorse these claims. On the contrary, we think they are highly dubious. 
At least with respect to constitutional interpretation, a genuine concern 
about judicial discretion would lead, in our view, not to originalism but to 
something like James Bradley Thayer’s view that courts ought to grant 
legislation a strong presumption of constitutionality66 or perhaps to John Hart 
Ely’s view that legislative outputs should receive Thayerian deference unless 
judicial review is needed to correct failures in democratic representation.67 
Meanwhile, the idea that interpretation is a single activity that proceeds 
similarly across all domains strikes us as very odd. One uses poems, recipes, 
contracts, statutes, and constitutions (to name just five kinds of writings) for 
different purposes, and so there should be nothing surprising, much less 
illegitimate, about using different modes of interpretation for each kind of 
writing, in light of its respective purpose. 
But if one were forced to select a single, most natural, mode of 
interpretation, it strikes us that intentionalism—well-suited as it is to making 
sense of ordinary language—would be the leading candidate, not O&T. We can 
explain why with a hypothetical example. 
Suppose one of the current co-authors asks the other co-author whether 
he would like some milk with his coffee. According to O&T, the question refers 
to milk from a cow, because that is the way in which most people use and 
                                               
64 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 66 (1988) (“To claim to find missing answers by 
‘interpretation’ is to seize power while blaming Congress.”); see also William Baude, 
Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213 (2018).  
65 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 698–700 (2009); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA 218 (1990).  
66 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
67 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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understand the word milk. The public meaning of milk is milk from a cow. 
However, because both of the current authors are vegan, and each of us knows 
that the other is vegan, it would be foolish for the askee to answer “no” on the 
ground that he does not want cow’s milk if the askee in fact wants a plant-
based milk with his coffee.68 As used by the asker and as understood by the 
askee in light of who did the asking, in this context milk refers to a plant-based 
milk of some sort because that is the intended meaning. The askee might want 
to clarify whether he is being offered soy milk, oat milk, or some other plant-
based milk, but he would not simply assume that he is being offered milk from 
a cow on the ground that that is how the public would understand the term. In 
ordinary language, we are intentionalists, not textualists.69 
Accordingly, to the extent that one thinks that the Constitution and 
statutes should be understood in the same way as everyday communication70—
that is, to the extent that one thinks, as textualists often say, that there is an 
obvious way to read legal texts that is not at all distinctive to legal texts—one 
will land on intentionalism, not textualism. 
Moreover, taking account of the nature of distinctly legal texts tends to 
reinforce the appeal of intentionalism, via the following straightforward near-
syllogism: (1) The People choose our lawmakers, whether via special processes 
                                               
68 The federal government defines milk as the “lacteal secretion . . . of a cow.” 21 C.F.R. § 
131.110. (1993). That definition is overly restrictive as a standard of identity. Soy milk 
labeled simply “milk” would admittedly cause consumer confusion, because many people 
would simply assume the package contained milk from a cow. However, suitably qualified 
as “soy milk,” there would be little likelihood of confusion. See Painter v. Blue Diamond 
Growers, 757 Fed. Appx. 517, 519 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of lawsuit against 
almond milk seller on the ground that no reasonable consumer would be misled into 
thinking that almond milk labeled “almond milk” was cow’s milk). 
69 Stanley Fish gives an example in which he construes his father’s statement “Go through 
the light” to mean “As soon as the light turns green, drive straight ahead; don’t turn either 
left or right,” rather than “Don’t stop, just barrel on through” the red light. Stanley Fish, 
There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 629 (2005). Fish thinks that 
the difference between his interpretation and the rejected one is not between his father’s 
intentions and “meaning an utterance has by virtue of the lexical items and syntactic 
structures that make it up,” id, but between one account of his father’s intent and another. 
See id. at 630–33 (arguing that meaning is impossible without some attribution of 
intention). Although our example draws the same contrast as Fish’s, we do not find it 
necessary here to endorse (or reject) his further view that any comprehensible notion of 
public meaning also depends on attributed intentions. 
70 To be clear, we do not argue that legal interpretation should be just like everyday 
communication. As Richard Fallon observes, legislation differs from ordinary 
conversation. Hence, one should not assume that the words of a statute convey meaning 
in the same way that words in ordinary conversation do—or even that meaning can be 
attributed to a legislature’s authoritative utterances in roughly the same way that it can 
be attributed to the utterances of ordinary speakers. See Richard H. Fallon, The Statutory 
Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 276 (2019). 
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for constitutions or through periodic elections for legislators; (2) the 
enactments of our lawmakers are legitimately law as a consequence of that 
democratic/republican pedigree; (3) thus, when uncertainty about the content 
of the law arises, it should be resolved in favor of the original intentions and 
expectations of the lawmakers and the People they represented, rather than in 
accordance with some implication of the words they used, at least if that 
implication would have surprised them, because surprising implications (such 
as the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids de jure racial segregation 
and most forms of official sex discrimination) were never adopted by the People 
or their representatives. 
To be clear, we ourselves are Living Constitutionalists and purposivists 
in statutory cases, not intentionalists. Our point here is simply that proponents 
of O&T are mistaken in thinking and arguing that general principles of 
language naturally support their view; experience from everyday 
communication more naturally supports intentionalism. That said, we think 
proponents of O&T have very strong normative grounds for rejecting 
intentionalism in constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
As we expect the parenthetical references to Jim Crow and patriarchy 
two paragraphs up indicate, while intentionalism may have a certain natural 
linguistic appeal, it often leads to unacceptably odious results, especially in 
constitutional cases, where the very high bar for constitutional amendments 
locks in archaic views if one consistently interprets the text in accordance with 
the concrete intentions and expectations of those who framed and ratified it in 
an earlier, and by our standards much less enlightened, era. Accordingly, over 
the last generation or two, self-styled originalists have largely disavowed 
intentions-and-expectations originalism in favor of original public meaning. 
To be sure, public-meaning originalists rarely say that they favor public 
meaning because it can be defined at a sufficiently high level of generality to 
enable them to avoid the odious results to which intentions-and-expectations 
originalism sometimes leads. Rather, they typically cite the indeterminacy of 
shared intentions and expectations that one sees in the arguments that the 
likes of Scalia offered against intentionalism in statutory interpretation.71 
And, to be fair, that is also a good argument against intentionalism when 
dealing with large representative bodies. 
The upshot in both domains (statutory and constitutional 
interpretation) is the same: An emphasis on original public meaning at a 
sufficiently high level of generality to enable judges and scholars to have their 
cake and eat it too. They avoid being bound by concrete intentions and 
expectations they wish to avoid, while still claiming a substantially greater 
                                               
71 See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19. HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
411 (1996); Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and Indeterminacy, 19. HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 429 (1996). 
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measure of objectivity and neutrality for their approach than one sees in the 
work of supposedly result-oriented scholars and jurists who favor Living 
Constitutionalism and purposivism. As the next sub-Part explains, however, 
the claim of objectivity and neutrality is false in all nontrivial senses. 
 
B.  The Under-determinacy of O&T 
 
In arguing that O&T only pretends to objectivity and neutrality, we do 
not mean to stake out a nihilistic position. We acknowledge that in a great 
many contexts, the law’s content is sufficiently determinate to provide primary 
actors and government officials with enough guidance to allow the law to play 
its vital coordination function. We agree with a prominent response to the most 
extreme claims of legal realism and later critical legal studies: focusing almost 
exclusively on contested appellate cases provides a misleading picture of the 
law as a whole.72 
According to Dennis Patterson, “[i]nterpretation is an activity of 
clarification.”73 Insofar as Patterson was making a deep claim about the 
difference between easy and hard questions, that view is controversial.74 But 
as a practical account of legal practice, he got it right. What makes an easy 
case easy is that whether or not interpretation is going on, there will be little 
doubt about the result. For example, textualists, intentionalists, and 
purposivists will agree—without needing to consult their respective 
interpretive theories—that dollar amounts listed in the Internal Revenue Code 
refer to U.S. dollars rather than, say, to the Spanish silver dollar.75 The age 
limits for serving in the House, Senate, and the presidency present even easier 
cases, because one strains to imagine what else, say, “the Age of thirty five 
Years” could possibly mean. A great deal of law works in this way. The critics 
of legal realism were right that a too-narrow focus on appellate cases 
exaggerates the law’s gaps and ambiguities. 
                                               
72 See Frederic R. Kellogg, Legal Scholarship in the Temple of Doom: Pragmatism’s 
Response to Critical Legal Studies, 65 TUL. L. REV. 15, 21–32 (1990); John Hasnas, Back 
to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, Or How Not To Miss 
the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84 (1995). 
73 DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 87 (1996). 
74 See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
133, 149–50 (1997) (reviewing Patterson, supra note 73 and RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) 
(contrasting Patterson’s account with Dworkin’s view that interpretation occurs even in 
easy cases)). 
75 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Surprising Originalism: The Regula Lecture, 9 CONLAWNOW 
235, 244 (2018) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment’s reference to dollars does invoke 
the Spanish silver dollar). 
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But the legal realists were also right to turn their attention to appellate 
cases, because it is precisely in such cases that one needs interpretation, 
understood per Patterson as clarification. And once one recognizes that fact, 
one understands why textualism is practically a non sequitur. Appellate courts 
review trial court determinations of fact deferentially, but they review legal 
findings de novo. Accordingly, litigants are most likely to prevail on—and thus 
most likely to pursue an—appeal when there is uncertainty about the law. 
Saying, as textualism does, that in such circumstances the courts should be 
bound by the text is almost completely unhelpful. Cases are on appeal because 
the text, at least as applied to the particular circumstances, is unclear. 
Legislation on any reasonably complex subject will contain gaps and 
errors that judges will need to fill and correct when concrete cases bring to 
light problems that the legislature could not and/or did not anticipate.76 In 
filling such gaps, judges’ values, experiences, and ideological druthers will play 
an important role, whether or not they acknowledge as much to themselves or 
others. As Richard Fallon puts the point provocatively but, we think, 
accurately, in the cases that generate real controversy, “a statute’s meaning . . 
. will be an invention. . . .”77 
To be sure, self-described O&T judges deny their own agency,78 but their 
claims are not plausible,79 as we can see from the convergence of O&T with 
other approaches over time. It has been nearly a decade and a half since 
Jonathan Molot insightfully observed: “Textualism has outlived its utility as 
                                               
76 Accord Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and his Textualist Ideal, 85 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 907 (2017) (“The legislature, acting in advance, can never 
anticipate every situation to which its statutes will apply, and it therefore writes general 
language that covers some situations that legislators would probably not wish to cover if 
these situations had occurred to them. [Further,] it can never catch every drafting error 
in its work product.”). 
77 Fallon, supra note 70, at 276. 
78 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2121 
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (“not buying” such 
“excuses” as the claim that “[s]tatutory interpretation is an inherently complex process” 
that permit judges, who should act as “umpires” to “largely define their own strike zones”); 
SCALIA AND GARNER, supra note 12, at 5 (“beyond . . . retail application, good judges 
dealing with statutes do not make law. They do not ‘give new content’ to the statute, but 
merely apply the content that has been there all along.”). 
79 Indeed, one can argue that textualists are less bound by law than judges who seek 
guidance in such sources as legislative history. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New 
Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 536 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA 
AND GARNER, supra note 12) (arguing that “the actual effect of the Scalia-Garner canons 
would not be greater judicial restraint but instead a relatively less constrained and 
somewhat more antidemocratic textualism.”). 
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an intellectual movement”80 because of the “convergence”81 of textualism and 
other approaches. 
Some textualists fought back, but only at the great cost of neutering 
textualism. For example, Manning conceded that textualism’s early claims to 
determinacy were overstated, but defended what he called “second-generation 
textualism,” in which judges “have a duty to enforce clearly worded statutes as 
written, even if there is reason to believe that the text may not perfectly 
capture the background aims or purposes that inspired their enactment.”82 
That ostensibly tactical retreat more nearly resembles a complete surrender, 
for now textualism’s office is limited to addressing “clearly worded statutes,” 
but, as we explained above, the point of an interpretive philosophy is to address 
cases in which the law is unclear. 
At best, perhaps Manning’s gambit just barely distinguishes textualism 
from versions of intentionalism and purposivism that accept the so-called 
absurdity doctrine, which authorizes judges to disregard the plain meaning of 
a statute to avoid absurd results,83 but even if so, that distinction amounts to 
precious little. The paradigmatic example of the absurdity doctrine is Holy 
Trinity Church v. United States, in which the Supreme Court conceded that 
the pre-payment of a foreign pastor was “within the letter” of a federal statute 
forbidding the hiring of aliens “to perform labor or service of any kind” but 
nonetheless held that the payment was not covered by the statute “because not 
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”84 Yet, given the 
unimportance of the absurdity doctrine in the Court’s recent jurisprudence, “a 
method of interpretation that defines itself in opposition to Holy Trinity is 
grossly underdetermined.”85 Manning’s “second-generation textualism” ends 
up looking a whole lot like contemporary purposivism. 
Meanwhile, one sees the same convergence with respect to originalism 
in constitutional interpretation. Already in 1996, Ronald Dworkin considered 
“semantic originalism” sufficiently “innocuous” to embrace it in a book that 
advocated what he called the “moral reading” of the Constitution.86 Jack 
                                               
80 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
81 Id. at 4. 
82 John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2010). 
83 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2003) (“If 
one accepts the textualist critique of strong intentionalism, it is difficult to sustain the 
absurdity doctrine.”). 
84 143 U.S. 457, 458–59 (1892). 
85 Dorf, supra note 50, at 15.  
86 DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 291. The term “semantic originalism” has come to be 
associated with an influential paper by Lawrence Solum. See Lawrence 
B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Nov. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at the 
Social Science Research Network (a/k/a SSRN), available at 
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Balkin drove the point home in his provocatively titled book Living 
Originalism, in which he wrote that originalism and Living Constitutionalism 
are “two sides of the same coin.”87 Likewise, in his book titled The Living 
Constitution, David Strauss observed that “professed originalists” sometimes 
“define ‘original meaning’ in a way that ends up making originalism 
indistinguishable from a form of living constitutionalism.”88 
If it were only Living Constitutionalists who claimed that contemporary 
originalism gives judges as much room to maneuver as Living 
Constitutionalism, one could perhaps dismiss the claim as tendentious, but one 
sees the same propensity in the works of, for lack of a better term, “core” 
originalists. For example, during his Supreme Court confirmation testimony 
in 1987, Judge Robert Bork endorsed a version of originalism sufficiently 
capacious to embrace Brown v. Board of Education.89 In addition, leading 
originalist scholars like Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum, and Keith 
Whittington have long acknowledged that while originalism is a method for 
discerning the meaning of the Constitution, meaning is often indeterminate, 
leaving substantial room to engage in what they call construction.90 And going 
even further, William Baude and Stephen Sachs have offered an account of 
originalism so broad that they can classify nearly all of existing constitutional 
jurisprudence as originalist.91 
Put simply, while there might remain small differences between, on one 
hand, textualism and originalism and, on the other hand, their respective main 
rivals in statutory and constitutional interpretation, there has been so much 
                                               
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244 (last visited Feb. 11, 2020)). 
In using the term, we do not mean to invoke Solum’s entire account of originalism. Rather, 
we use the term as Dworkin did, simply to refer to original public meaning rather than 
original intent. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 61, at 115, 121 
(chiding Justice Scalia for his inconsistent application of “semantic-originalis[m]”). 
87 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 21 (2011). 
88 DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 10–11 (2010). 
89 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a description of Bork’s testimony, see DWORKIN, supra note 74, 
at 294–301. 
90 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 
(2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 453 (2013); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED 
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999). Recently Barnett has argued that original 
meaning provides some constraint even in the “construction zone,” Randy E. Barnett & 
Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: a Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L. 
J. 1, 14–17 (2018), but that is a far cry from the determinacy that originalists used to 
proclaim. 
91 See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015); William 
Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 13 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2019). 
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convergence that O&T cannot fairly be deemed more objective, neutral, or 
determinate than those rivals. 
One might therefore wonder why any of this debate matters. If O&T 
differs little from other prescriptive methodologies, perhaps we are wasting our 
time debating about methodology. 
The debate nonetheless matters because proponents of O&T 
opportunistically switch between the intellectually defensible but under-
determinate versions of their approach—which do not differ substantially from 
rival approaches to interpretation—and the ostensibly more determinate 
approaches—such as intentions-and-expectations originalism—which they 
invoke to criticize as result-oriented those who disagree with their concrete 
judgments.92 Accordingly, we conclude this sub-Part more or less as we 
concluded the previous one. We observe that O&T pretends to but does not in 
fact provide more constraint than other leading approaches to constitutional 
and statutory interpretation. 
 
C.  O&T in Practice: Predictably Ideological 
 
Our argument that O&T merely pretends to be substantially more 
objective, neutral, and determinate than other approaches to constitutional 
and statutory interpretation has, to this point, relied on the nature of O&T as 
it has evolved over time. But our argument is also empirically testable. If O&T 
substantially constrained jurists, one would expect that a justice who practiced 
it would be somewhat ideologically unpredictable. And yet, as we shall explain, 
O&T in practice is predictably ideologically conservative. 
We will provide evidence for that claim momentarily, but first, we need 
to address a threshold objection. Perhaps O&T produces conservative results 
because that is simply where an honest approach to uncovering original public 
meaning leads. This is a prima facie plausible objection in various categories 
of cases. For example, perhaps the original public meaning of “commerce . . . 
among the several States” referred only to trade, not other economic activity, 
which would mean that an originalist justice would be less inclined to uphold 
federal power than a non-originalist justice. Given that “states’ rights” codes 
as conservative, here honest originalism would have a conservative bent 
because of the nature of the historical materials, not because of any lack of 
constraint on the ideological preferences of the academics, judges, and justices 
who purport to practice originalism. 
                                               
92 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2022 (2012) 
(reviewing BALKIN, supra note 87, and STRAUSS, supra note 88) (describing Justice 
Thomas as a “public-meaning-in-theory-but-expected-application-in-fact” originalist and 
noting that Senators and the broader public treat “original intent, original expected 
application, and original semantic meaning more or less interchangeably.”). 
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Moreover, we might expect that O&T would lead to conservative results 
on average, not just in particular cases, because O&T is backward looking. 
Non-practitioners of O&T will be more inclined to say that changing social 
attitudes warrant changing constitutional and statutory doctrines. And as 
those attitudes tend (on average over the very long run) to change in the 
direction of more liberal approaches, the resistance that O&T provides against 
change will be conservative. 
For example, the modern LGBTQ rights movement postdates the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the enactment of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. Accordingly, one might think that O&T would reject LGBTQ 
rights because those texts reflect earlier norms, rather than because 
conservative justices disapproved of same-sex marriage in 201593 and 
workplace protections for LGBTQ persons in 2020.94 
Even that example, however, does little to establish that O&T is just 
about uncovering public meaning, because the relevant texts—“equal 
protection” and “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex”—are certainly broad 
enough to cover anti-LGBTQ bias. Indeed, prominent originalists have 
contended that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment supports 
marriage equality,95 and the most straightforward argument for finding that 
federal employment discrimination law protects against anti-LGBTQ bias is 
textualist.96 Backward-looking arguments against constitutional and statutory 
protection against such bias rely on intentions-and-expectations originalism97 
and intentionalism98 as specifically distinguished from original-public-
meaning originalism and textualism. 
                                               
93 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
94 See Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-1618 (argued Oct. 8, 2019); R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 18-107 (argued 
Oct. 8, 2019). [We will update after the rulings.] 
95 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 648 (2016). 
96 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism’s Moment of Truth, SCOTUSblog Symposium 
(Sep. 4, 2019), available at https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-textualisms-
moment-of-truth/ (asking rhetorically whether “the justices who say they apply a 
scrupulously neutral commitment to statutory text, structure and precedent have the 
courage of their methodological convictions”). 
97 See Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Originalism in Support of Respondent, Obergefell 
v. Hodges, 135 S.C.t 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556), at 5 (objecting to the original-public-
meaning argument for same-sex marriage proposed in a brief supporting petitioners by 
arguing that the “distinction between what a provision ‘means’ and what its enactors and 
the public subject to it ‘understood’ it to mean is untenable.”). 
98 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Employers, Bostock 
v. Clayton County (No. 17-1618) (argued Oct. 8, 2019), at 3–4 (“The legislative history of 
Title VII does not support the view that Congress intended to include sexual orientation 
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However, there may be substantial overlap between original intentions 
and expectations on the one hand and original meaning on the other.99 If so, 
perhaps the conservative bent of intentions-and-expectations originalism gives 
a conservative bent to public-meaning originalism. Let us concede only for the 
sake of argument, therefore, that O&T should lead to conservative results on 
average, even when practiced by an academic, judge, or justice with no 
ideological axe to grind. 
Yet even that arguendo concession is extremely modest. It might not 
apply at all to large domains of statutory interpretation, because many 
statutes that currently give rise to contested cases (such as those protecting 
the environment) were enacted in the relatively recent past during somewhat 
more liberal or progressive periods. In statutory interpretation, we would 
expect that an honestly backward-looking approach would yield a fair number 
of liberal or progressive results when the judges deploying it looked back to, 
say, the 1970s. 
And even with respect to constitutional interpretation, a genuinely 
constraining backward-looking approach should lead to an ideologically mixed 
record rather than one that is decidedly conservative. That is because the 
ostensibly expected conservative lean from looking backward is small-c 
conservative—i.e., it will tend towards conserving past attitudes and practices. 
But while some contemporary views that observers today describe as 
ideologically conservative (what we might call Big-C Conservative), are also 
small-c conservative, many are not. For instance, the contemporary Big-C 
Conservative attacks on campaign finance regulation,100 mandatory union 
dues,101 and regulations of commercial speech102 do not “conserve” any 1791 
understanding of the First Amendment or any 1868 understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (which, according to the Court’s cases, makes the First 
Amendment applicable to the states). Nor does the contemporary conservative 
view favoring color-blindness conserve an 1868 understanding (as reflected in 
the fact that the Court’s color-blindness jurisprudence says virtually nothing 
about original meaning).  
                                               
and gender identity as protected classes under Title VII. While the legislative history of 
the sex amendment is not extensive, it is sufficient to establish that Congress intended 
the amendment to protect women’s rights.”). 
99 See Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 493 (2016) (“the lines 
between founders’ expected applications and their beliefs in the meanings of the words 
that they drafted or ratified may be blurred.”). 
100 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
101 Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 
S.Ct. 2448 (2018). 
102 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
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Indeed, it would be astounding if an honest effort to unearth the original 
understanding of various constitutional clauses from the Founding and 
Reconstruction yielded the contemporary Conservative program—which 
reflects the peculiar mix of anti-regulatory business interests, social 
conservatism on gender relations, and white resentment of racial minorities 
that characterizes the current, highly contingent, Republican Party coalition. 
One might expect some overlap and even some net positive correlation to the 
extent that there may be some positive correlation between small-c 
conservatism and Big-C Conservatism. But if O&T were constraining and 
determinate, the sheer messiness of history and contemporary politics would 
mean that an honest originalist (of any flavor) voting his or her methodological 
rather than ideological druthers would end up roughly center-right on average 
(at most), with a high degree of variance. 
Is that what we find when we examine the data? Not even close. When 
political scientists code for ideological valence of the issues that come before 
the Supreme Court, they find that the most consistently ideologically 
conservative justice is Clarence Thomas—who also most consistently espouses 
and purports to practice originalism. Here is a useful chart that we have 
borrowed from a FiveThirtyEight data rendering based on a technique created 




                                               
103 Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The Supreme Court Might Have Three Swing Justices Now, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jul. 2, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-
might-have-three-swing-justices-now/; Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic 
Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). Martin-Quinn scores are based on a Bayesian-
inference dynamic item response model. Id. at 135.  
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That pattern contradicts the arguendo hypothesis that originalism has 
a slight on-average conservative lean with a high degree of variance. What is 
really happening? The most natural explanation is that originalism might 
affect the style in which an opinion is written but has no more constraining 
force on how a justice votes than do other methodologies. 
One sees the same effect in statutory cases. Joseph Kimble reviewed 
data on Justice Scalia’s votes in statutory cases104 and on the votes of self-
professed textualist justices on the Michigan Supreme Court.105 We commend 
his analysis to interested readers, though here we merely quote his conclusion 
with respect to the Michigan study, which mirrors his findings about Justice 
Scalia. Kimble discovers overwhelming evidence that “[i]n practice, textualism 
has devolved into a vehicle for ideological judging—disguised as deference to 
the legislature.”106 
We are tempted to end this Part with that quotation, but before 
concluding we should respond to an objection to an earlier version of the 
foregoing argument.107 Perhaps it is true, the objection goes, that self-professed 
originalists and textualists have not heretofore had the courage of their 
convictions, but if so, that is not an indictment of O&T; it might simply mean 
that the judges and justices who profess O&T have failed to apply it honestly. 
A better, more principled breed of O&T judges might produce the neutral, 
objective, and relatively determinate results that O&T promises. 
We offer three responses. First, as we argued above in sub-Parts A and 
B of this Part, the indeterminacy of O&T across a wide range of issues that 
come before appellate courts follows from the nature of the methodology rather 
than its misuse. Indeterminacy—and thus the capacity to serve as a vessel for 
ideology—is baked into O&T. 
Second, there is a certain unreality about the objection. If no one who 
has yet exercised judicial power—not even Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas—
counts as a “real” originalist or textualist, then perhaps we should not regard 
                                               
104 Joseph Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the Example in Barnhart, Why 
Both Are Weak, and How Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 30–35 
(2015). 
105 Joseph Kimble, What the Michigan Supreme Court Wrought in the Name of 
Textualism and Plain Meaning: A Study of Cases Overruled, 2000-2015, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 
347 (2017). 
106 Id. at 376. 
107 See Lawrence B. Solum, Comments on Dorf on Originalism & Determinacy: Part One, 
Concepts and Terminology, https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/08/comments-on-
dorf-on-originalism-determinacy-part-one-concepts-and-terminology.html (Aug. 25, 2017) 
(commenting on Michael C. Dorf, How Determinate is Originalism in Practice?, 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/08/how-determinate-is-originalism-in.html (Aug. 25, 
2017)). 
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O&T itself as real. To dismiss all self-styled originalists and textualists as 
impostors bears an uncomfortable resemblance to what communists in the 
west used to say when confronted with the murderous and otherwise 
disastrous record of Soviet and Chinese communism. That is 
not real communism, they would say, pointing to some difference between 
Leninism or Maoism on the ground and what they regarded as the proper 
understanding of Karl Marx’s often-opaque writings.108 And the western 
communists were right, in a sense: the real-world efforts to build communist 
states ended up departing in various ways from the orthodoxy that can 
plausibly be constructed from the theoretical tomes. However, at some point 
one must judge a prescriptive theory by the actual real-world results of the 
efforts to apply it, even if those efforts depart in some ways from the theory. 
That is why it is fair to pronounce communism a dismal failure. Likewise, we 
may be reaching the point where it is also fair to pronounce O&T—understood 
as anything other than a rhetorical smokescreen for extremely Conservative 
results—a failure. 
Third, even if at some time in the future a cadre of principled, neutral 
practitioners of O&T emerges, that would not undercut our current project. We 
aim in this Article to explain why we see so little conflict between L&E and 
O&T. Our explanation is that both L&E and O&T merely pretend to neutrality, 
objectivity, and determinacy, while in practice serving as a cover for ideology. 
The next Part develops that explanation in greater detail by focusing on the 
mechanisms scholars and jurists have used to suppress the potential conflict 
between L&E and O&T. For now, we simply emphasize that the theoretical 
possibility of a different kind of O&T emerging in the future does not bear on 
our explanation for the pattern we observe to date. 
 
IV.  The Unreconciled Conflict Between the Two Formalisms 
 
Thus far we have offered grounds for questioning the claims that L&E 
and O&T are—or indeed ever could be—objective and apolitical methodologies 
for resolving concrete cases. In the sorts of legal conflicts that courts must 
decide, we argued above, whether one outcome is more “efficient” than another 
or whether one outcome hews more closely to the original public meaning of 
the statutory or constitutional text than another will typically be impossible to 
answer without at least unconscious recourse to normative views. Accordingly, 
we concluded that L&E and O&T typically obscure rather than substitute for 
normative value judgments. We further suggested that this obscuring of 
normative value judgments may be the basis of a significant measure of the 
appeal to the adherents of both methodologies. 
                                               
108 See Satya Gabriel et al., State Capitalism Versus Communism: What Happened in the 
USSR and the PRC?, 34 CRITICAL SOC. 539 (2008). 
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This Part challenges the claims L&E and O&T to neutrality, objectivity, 
and determinacy in another way. If they were neutral, objective, and 
determinate, their prescriptions would not generally point in the same 
direction. According to O&T, a judge has license to adopt the rule that best 
promotes “efficiency”—as L&E instructs—only if the original public meaning 
of the relevant authoritative text so commands. The framers of the 
Constitution or members of Congress might on occasion have written such a 
command into the law, but most constitutional provisions and statutes contain 
no such licensing of L&E. Accordingly, one should expect to see O&T and L&E 
openly conflicting with some frequency. And as we noted in the Introduction, 
one does occasionally encounter such conflict, as in TVA v. Hill. More 
commonly, however, the mirroring manipulabilities of each methodology 
mediate and muzzle potential conflict. 
This Part surveys the field of battle as characterized in the scholarly 
literature and case law. We focus on the writings of prominent jurists who are 
or were also scholars. We show that when prominent conservative jurists even 
recognized the conflict between L&E and O&T, they reconciled the 
methodologies with mechanisms that are either inadequate or, if adequate, 
come at the substantial cost of undercutting the claims to neutrality, 
objectivity, and determinacy common to both formalisms. 
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A.  Mistaking Ideology for Consistency and Coherence 
 
In an article titled Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case 
Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making,109 
Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit lauds 
what he regards as the ascendancy of both O&T and L&E in the Supreme 
Court. Each philosophy, he claims, “promote[s] consistency and coherence in 
judicial decision making.”110 Ginsburg’s discussion of L&E focuses on antitrust 
cases. Either unaware of or deliberately choosing to ignore the Brandeisian 
conception of antitrust as serving social and political ends, not merely economic 
ones,111 Ginsburg audaciously asserts that, prior to the triumph of L&E, “the 
U.S. Supreme Court simply did not know what it was doing in 
antitrust cases.”112 However, Ginsburg cheerily reports that under the 
influence of scholars who identified the goal of antitrust as promoting 
consumer welfare (typically understood as low prices), the Court eventually 
came to its senses.113 He takes great satisfaction in observing that while in the 
mid-1960s to 1970s antitrust defendants won just over a third of their Supreme 
Court cases, by the first decade of the twenty-first century their record was 
perfect: thirteen wins in thirteen cases.114 
Why celebrate such a track record? Ginsburg aims to show that L&E in 
antitrust cases promotes consistency, and a methodology that consistently 
favors one side certainly does that. Yet numerous alternative rules of law 
would also promote consistency in this minimal sense. For example, if one 
construed the antitrust laws according to the mechanical rule “defendant 
always wins,” outcomes would be perfectly consistent. But perfect consistency 
in the sense of a prediction that the defendant always wins undercuts any 
plausible claim that the courts are giving effect to the statute, which would 
serve no purpose if it covered no conduct at all. Perhaps aware that a perfectly 
predictable batting average of zero for plaintiffs should not be the sine qua non 
of sound judicial decision making, Ginsburg acknowledges that 
“[e]conomic analysis does not indicate a single indisputable result in 
every case . . . .”115 Nonetheless, he contends, L&E “does significantly constrain 
                                               
109 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 217 (2010). 
110 Id. at 217. 
111 See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 
122 (2018) (describing the “Brandeisian school” of antitrust) (citing Louis D. Brandeis, A 
Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY. 18 (Jan. 10, 1914)). 
112 Ginsburg, supra note 109, at 217. 
113 See id. at 223. 
114 Id. at 219. 
115 Id. at 223. 
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the decision making of the Court and thereby narrow the range of plausible 
outcomes. Economic analysis thus promotes consistency in antitrust 
jurisprudence.”116 
After pronouncing L&E a success in antitrust cases, Ginsburg next 
turns to constitutional originalism, which he also deems a substantial 
improvement over the muddle that he thinks immediately preceded it—here 
Living Constitutionalism.117 Ginsburg credits various scholars and lawyers for 
the rise of originalism, including Raoul Berger, Attorney General Edwin 
Meese, and Justice Antonin Scalia,118 but the key figure—the bridge between 
Ginsburg’s laudatory treatment of L&E in antitrust cases and originalism in 
constitutional interpretation (and beyond)—is his fellow failed nominee for the 
Supreme Court seat that Justice Anthony Kennedy eventually filled, Judge 
Robert Bork. 
Ginsburg credits Bork’s antitrust scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s 
with catalyzing the ensuing judicial reorientation around consumer welfare.119 
Although Ginsburg does not discuss Bork in the part of his article that sings 
the praises of originalism, that fact is more a shortcoming of Ginsburg’s article 
than of Bork’s proper place in the originalist firmament. Justice Scalia came 
to be seen as the leading judicial champion of originalism because he sat on the 
Supreme Court, but judged by the different receptions each received in the 
Senate just one year apart, it is evident that before that ascent, liberals more 
closely associated Bork than Scalia with originalism and its perils: Scalia was 
confirmed 98-0,120 while Bork was rejected in large part because of the fear 
that his brand of originalism would roll back civil rights.121 
History is not only written by, but also about, the victors. However, a 
fair retelling of what we might deem the rise-and-fall-and-subsequent-rise of 
originalism would regard Bork as a central figure because of the role that his 
support for originalism played in his high-profile 1987 confirmation hearing, 
                                               
116 Id. 
117 See id. at 225 (contrasting the supposed “intuitive and normative weight of the 
originalist idea” with the “obvious difficulties for the Rule of Law” posed by Living 
Constitutionalism’s adaptability). 
118 See id. at 223–24. 
119 See id. at 223 n.8 and accompanying text (citing Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and 
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 10–11 (1966); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50–51 (1978)). 
120 See Michael Patrick King, Justice Antonin Scalia: The First Term on the Supreme 
Court—1986-1987, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2 (1988). 
121 Contrary to a narrative that the political right promotes to this day, Bork’s rejection 
was mostly on the merits, not a result of a smear campaign. See Michael Kinsley, Bork Is 
Back, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (June 2010) (arguing that Bork was not “borked” by a 
political hit job but rejected based on the substance of his views). 
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i.e., his role in the (apparently temporary) “fall” part of the story.122 Thus, to 
understand the relation between L&E and O&T among conservative jurists 
and scholars over the last half century, one could hardly do better than to study 
Bork.  
So, how did Bork reconcile L&E in antitrust cases with O&T? He 
claimed that the original understanding of the Sherman Act gave pride of place 
to consumer welfare,123 not the other values (such as the political economy 
associated with small businesses) that judges both contemporaneously and 
subsequently had found in the Act. First articulating his view in the 1960s, 
before the rise of modern textualism, Bork’s brand of statutory originalism 
relied on legislative history124 in a way that textualists like Scalia would later 
reject,125 but we can put that point aside because it would be relatively simple 
to recast Bork’s argument about the subjective intent of the Sherman Act’s 
framers in contemporary terms as an argument about the original public 
meaning of the Act. Either way, Bork and likeminded conservatives would 
seem to have a ready means of reconciling L&E with O&T: The judge employs 
L&E because the meaning of the authoritative text (whether inferred using 
old-school methods for divining legislative intent or newfangled methods for 
discerning original public meaning) so commands the judge. In this 
reconciliation, O&T is the fundamental interpretive methodology, with the 
employment of L&E contingent on the output of O&T. 
So far so good. If judges employed L&E only where O&T directed them 
to do so, the reconciliation would work. But in fact that is not the pattern we 
observe. Instead, we see judges either straining to derive L&E from O&T or 
ignoring the problem altogether. 
Consider Bork’s attributing to the Sherman Act’s authors a focus on 
consumer welfare. A scholarly consensus holds that despite citing the 
Congressional Record, Bork was dead wrong about the goals of the Congress 
that passed the Sherman Act. As Herbert Hovenkamp would observe, “Bork’s 
analysis of the legislative history was strained, heavily governed by his own 
                                               
122 For a theoretically sophisticated account by one of Bork’s intellectual opponents, see 
DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 263–305 (critiquing both Bork’s originalism and Bork’s 
portrayal of it during and after the confirmation hearing). 
123 See Bork, Legislative Intent, supra note 119, at 11–21 (discussing legislative history of 
the Sherman Act). 
124 See id. 
125 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in SCALIA, supra note 61, 
at 3, 32 (“assuming, contrary to all reality, that the search for ‘legislative intent’ is a search 
for something that exists, that something is not likely to be found in the archives of 
legislative history”). 
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ideological agenda.”126 Indeed, even Daniel Crane, who offers a “modest 
defense of Bork against his sharpest critics on the question of antitrust’s 
goals,”127 does not defend Bork’s claim that the Congress that enacted the 
Sherman acted had the subjective intentions that Bork ascribed to it. Rather, 
in Crane’s view, although Bork was less skeptical of legislative history than 
Justice Scalia or Judge Frank Easterbrook,128 he was nonetheless seeking an 
objective rather than a subjective understanding of the antitrust statutes, an 
understanding that fits reasonably well with the textualist turn by other 
conservative jurists that followed Bork’s landmark antitrust scholarship.129 
But so what? Perhaps Bork goofed by attributing his brand of consumer 
welfare motives to the authors of the Sherman Act, but if that is what the Act 
requires on O&T grounds, then there is no conflict here between O&T and 
L&E. Right? 
Not really. It might be true that one can read the Sherman Act’s 
language in a way that does not contradict Bork’s consumer welfare 
interpretation, but one can also read it in any number of other ways. Certainly 
nothing Crane cites suggests that Bork derived consumer welfare as the 
driving purpose of antitrust from the statutory text, much less that the best 
textualist reading of the statute makes consumer welfare the master principle. 
                                               
126 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989). See 
also id. (“Not a single statement in the legislative history comes close to stating the 
conclusions that Bork drew.”); John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and 
the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic 
Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1137 (1987) 
(Judge Bork “is wrong in his reading of the legislative history” as evidenced by the fact 
that “[n]eoclassical price theory and its concept of efficiency were unknown when the 
major federal antitrust laws were adopted”); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 
HAST. L.J. 65, 68 (1982) (reading the historical record, contra Bork, to show “that Congress 
passed the antitrust laws to further economic objectives, but primarily objectives of a 
distributive rather than of an efficiency nature”); Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of 
Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 836 n.3 
(2014) (collecting the foregoing and additional sources). 
127 Crane, supra note 126, at 836. 
128 See id. at 842. 
129 Crane writes: 
With the emergence of textualism and “objective” approaches to statutory 
interpretation and the continued discussion about the value and meaning 
of judicial restraint, Bork’s arguments should be understood as 
significantly broader than the legislative history claims that have figured 
almost exclusively in the criticisms of his arguments in favor [of] reading 
the antitrust laws to advance a consumer welfare objective.  
Id. at 844. 
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Crane describes Bork’s argumentative strategy thus: “Bork’s arguments about 
the purposes of the antitrust laws were primarily grounded in a conventional 
suite of interpretive methodologies, including textual analysis, a ‘whole code’ 
reading of the antitrust laws, critical analysis of leading judicial expositors, 
and arguments about judicial restraint.”130 It is hardly clear to us that this 
approach is what Scalia, Easterbrook, and others would describe as textualism 
rather than its rival purposivism,131 but whatever one calls Bork’s approach, it 
appears better suited to reading L&E into a statute than to deriving L&E from 
a statute. Crane rescues Bork from the charge of inaccurately characterizing 
the subjective intentions of Congress only at the steep cost of characterizing 
Bork as adopting an interpretive methodology that is so vague as to license 
anything. Interestingly, that is also the very charge that Bork’s critics leveled 
at him when he appeared to undergo a “confirmation conversion” that 
permitted him to say that Brown v. Board of Education, which contradicted 
the subjective understanding of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, nonetheless conformed to the Amendment’s original 
understanding defined at a suitably high level of generality.132 
To be clear, in arguing that Bork manipulated (his version of) O&T to 
produce results he sought on other grounds—here, antitrust laissez-faire and 
a politically acceptable outcome in Brown—we take no position on whether he 
did so intentionally or even knowingly. Cognitive biases are powerful 
instruments. If one’s ideological priors are broadly libertarian, one will see the 
Founding and thus the Constitution in Lockean terms.133 If they are broadly 
communitarian, one will read the Founding as a period of civic 
republicanism.134 In citing Brown as an example, we mean to acknowledge that 
contemporary progressives and liberals, like conservatives, might also mistake 
what they seek for what they find.135 
Yet we also want to disavow a false equivalence. For roughly the last 
half century, conservatives have been much more insistent than progressives 
and liberals that they are applying the law objectively to derive results that 
simply happen to align with their ideological priors. Accordingly, in 
                                               
130 Id. 
131 See Dorf, supra note 50, at 7 (describing the difference between purposivism and 
textualism). See also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 73 (2006). 
132 See DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 263–305. 
133 See Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Burnett’s Case for a 
Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 861 (2005). 
134 See Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
135 But see Part V, infra. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553508
A Tale of Two Formalisms 
  49 
acknowledging universal human tendencies like confirmation bias and other 
cognitive distortions as the reason why Bork and other conservatives could be 
unaware that they are not actually deriving L&E from O&T, we do not thereby 
concede that progressives and liberals do so too or to the same degree. At least 
in the current era, progressives and liberals are much more likely than 
conservatives to call for open acknowledgment and acceptance of the role of a 
judge’s values and experience in deciding cases. 
 
 B.  An Alternative Reconciliation: Antitrust Exceptionalism 
 
But wait. Maybe we have generalized too much from Bork’s approach to 
antitrust. In a 2005 article, Daniel Farber and Brett McDonnell characterize 
the willingness of textualists to embrace a judge-empowering common-law 
methodology in antitrust cases as exceptional.136 Perhaps the likes of Judge 
Bork, Justice Scalia, and Judge Easterbrook treat antitrust as a sui generis 
exception to a background rule of textualism that is not so friendly to L&E. If 
so, then Farber and McDonnell would be right that “antitrust exceptionalism 
is unwarranted” and so the otherwise textualist jurists who embrace it ought 
to “either rethink their textualism or seriously consider jettisoning their 
approach to antitrust law.”137 
We agree with Farber and McDonnell that the dominant approach to 
antitrust—fully embraced by ostensibly conservative jurists—cannot readily 
be reconciled with O&T. However, we disagree with the further contention that 
this fact renders antitrust unique or even unusual. Wherever it applies, if not 
expressly authorized by statute or other authoritative source, L&E sits in 
tension with the claims of O&T. Some conservatives recognize the tension. 
Thus, Bork himself and Ginsburg in praising Bork recognize at least the prima 
facie need to ground L&E in a statutory source. As we observed in the previous 
sub-Part, the overwhelming scholarly consensus decries Bork’s effort to do so 
as a failure, but the important point here is that Bork saw the need to try. He 
did not claim some unique status for antitrust that exempted it from general 
jurisprudential principles. 
Meanwhile, Judge Easterbrook, who is a major player in the story that 
Farber and McDonnell tell,138 hardly restricts his employment of L&E to 
antitrust cases. Along with Judges Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, 
Easterbrook can be considered one of the founders of the modern school of 
                                               
136 See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is there a Text in this Class?” The Conflict 
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619 (2005). 
137 Id. at 622. 
138 Easterbrook’s name appears in text (that is, not footnotes) eight times in the Farber 
and McDonnell article. See id. at 620; 621; 622; 628; 631; 657 (twice); 668. 
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L&E.139 Yet far from confining his observations to antitrust, Easterbrook is 
best known for his work in corporate law140 and for his broader claim that L&E 
is not just a tool that authoritative text sometimes empowers judges to use, but 
that L&E is inevitable.141 
What about Scalia? We said above that Scalia’s perch on the Supreme 
Court led observers to focus on him to a greater extent than on scholars and 
other judges whose output is at least as important. Nonetheless, we do not 
deny that Scalia was a, if not the, central figure in conservative jurisprudence 
over the last generation. And Farber and McDonnell prominently cite Scalia 
as a textualist who engaged in antitrust exceptionalism.142 Accordingly, we 
should consider whether Scalia’s seeming departure from O&T was mere 
antitrust exceptionalism. 
Unlike Bork and Easterbrook, Scalia was not generally a champion of 
L&E. We therefore agree with Farber and McDonnell that when Scalia praised 
the capacity of antitrust law to develop in common-law fashion over time,143 he 
was articulating a view in tension with his customary praise for textualism. 
Still, we resist the conclusion that antitrust was special for Scalia. 
We resist that conclusion partly for reasons we laid out in Part III and 
to which we have adverted in this Part with respect to Bork. To find that the 
use of L&E actually contradicts the instructions of O&T, one would have to 
think that O&T is a sufficiently objective and determinate methodology to 
produce results of any sort—as opposed to merely masking judges’ priors. Yet 
as we explained above, O&T, at least as practiced by every jurist ever to profess 
it, lacks such determinacy in most of the cases likely to reach appellate courts. 
Moreover, we can find specific examples of Scalia applying something 
very much like L&E based on an inadequate basis in the authoritative text. 
Although Justice Scalia lacked a strong commitment to L&E, his ideological 
priors were anti-regulatory, which, in practice, often led to results that looked 
indistinguishable from those that a more expressly L&E-friendly conservative 
                                               
139 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS—A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1ST ED. 1973); FRANK 
H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991). Rounding out the roster of L&E pioneers who served on the federal appellate 
bench, we would include Judge Learned Hand, whose decision in United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), used cost-benefit analysis to define negligence 
and thus presaged the modern L&E movement. See id. at 173. 
140 See EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 139, passim. 
141 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Inevitability of Law and Economics, 1(1) LEGAL EDUC. 
REV. 3 (1989). 
142 See Farber and McDonnell, supra note 136, at 620–21. 
143 See id. at 620 (quoting Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. 717, 732 
(1988) (Scalia, J., for the Court)). 
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would endorse, even outside the context of antitrust. Environmental law cases 
can serve as illustrations. 
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,144 
the Supreme Court faced the question whether one who modifies or degrades 
habitat for an endangered or threatened species in a way that has the effect of 
killing or injuring wildlife “takes” that species within the meaning, and thus 
in violation, of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).145 The plain text pointed in 
favor of the affirmative answer that the majority opinion of Justice John Paul 
Stevens gave. Then, as now, the ESA itself defined “take” to mean “harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt 
to engage in any such conduct.”146 Destroying habitat for an endangered or 
threatened species will rather straightforwardly “harm” or “kill” members of 
that species. 
True, one might think that because most of the words in the definition 
of “take” involve intentional damage, “harm” and “kill” should likewise be 
limited. However, Justice Stevens and the majority had two excellent reasons 
for declining to read an intentionality requirement into the ESA. First, another 
provision of the ESA allowed the Secretary of the Interior to grant a permit for 
“incidental” takings of endangered species;147 if the primary prohibition on 
taking an endangered or threatened species only applied to intentional harm 
or death inflicted on such species members, there would be no need for an 
exception for incidental, i.e., unintentional, takings.148 Thus, the exception 
sheds light on the general definition. 
Second, Sweet Home arose by way of a challenge to a federal 
regulation.149 Hence, pursuant to longstanding principles of administrative 
law, the issue was not whether the best reading of the statute encompasses 
                                               
144 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
145 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 
146 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
147 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 691 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)). 
148 See id. at 700 (permitting provision “strongly suggests that Congress understood [take] 
to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings”). In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that 
the permitting provision did not bear on habitat modification, because other kinds of 
activities—such as fishing for an unprotected species—might incidentally result in 
harming or killing a protected species. See id. at 729–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). We do not 
understand why Justice Scalia thought this rejoinder responsive to the majority’s broader 
point that an act that does not aim to harm or kill protected species could nonetheless be 
deemed a taking of that species if it in fact has the incidental effect of harming or killing 
that species.  
149 50 CFR § 17.3 (1994). 
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habitat destruction but whether that is a reasonable reading to which the 
courts owe deference.150 
And yet Justice Scalia dissented. We quote his first paragraph in full, 
because we think it betrays an anti-regulatory sensibility, hostility to the goals 
of the ESA relative to traditional economic activity, and a conflation of those 
personal attitudes with the statute’s text. Justice Scalia wrote: 
 
I think it unmistakably clear that the legislation at issue 
here (1) forbade the hunting and killing of endangered animals, 
and (2) provided federal lands and federal funds for the 
acquisition of private lands, to preserve the habitat of endangered 
animals. The Court’s holding that the hunting and killing 
prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands 
imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin—not just upon 
the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land 
conscripted to national zoological use. I respectfully dissent.151 
 
Note the extreme confidence. Justice Scalia did not say that the best 
reading of the ESA excludes habitat destruction. He found the legislation 
“unmistakably clear.” Whether he sincerely believed that or whether he 
overstated the point in order to be able to avoid deferring to an agency 
construction of unclear language, we do not know. Either explanation, 
however, rather strongly damns Scalia’s brand of O&T. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Sweet Home shows that a professed 
commitment to textualism produces unwarranted confidence in the 
determinacy and meaning of language. His rhetoric also belittles 
environmental policy, dismissively describing the ESA as conscripting land to 
“national zoological use,” rather than describing the legislative objective as, 
say, preserving vital biodiversity. 
In other contexts, Justice Scalia was likewise dismissive of 
environmentalism. For example, in his majority opinion in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife,152 he mocked the notion that harm to endangered animals could be, 
ipso facto, harm to people concerned about those animals, conceptualizing 
humans’ only real interest in endangered species as exploitation or 
entertainment.153 In his dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA,154 he flirted with 
                                               
150 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697 (“The text of the Act provides three reasons for 
concluding that the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable.”) 
151 Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
152 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
153 See id. at 566 (respondents’ theory is “called, alas, the ‘animal nexus’ approach”);  
154 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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climate change denialism, describing “the buildup of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases in the upper reaches of the atmosphere” as “alleged to be causing global 
climate change.”155 In each of those cases, he concluded that environmental 
plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing to bring suit in federal court. That 
alone shows either the malleability of O&T or the priority Scalia gave to his 
ideological druthers over his ostensible jurisprudential commitments. 
Although modern standing doctrine purports to construe the words “cases” and 
“controversies” in Article III, it is essentially a twentieth century invention 
that arose alongside the rise of the administrative state.156 
While Scalia’s pro-industry/anti-environmental/anti-regulatory priors 
were evident just below the surface in Sweet Home and the environmental 
standing cases, he did not expressly endorse L&E in those cases. He did that 
in an environmental regulation case involving the Clean Air Act. 
In Michigan v. EPA,157 the Supreme Court reviewed an EPA regulation 
of power plants pursuant to a provision of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 authorizing regulation as “appropriate and necessary” based on a 
mandated study.158 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia condemned the 
agency—and thus refused to defer to its judgment—for failing to employ cost-
benefit analysis. That refusal, Justice Scalia said, was unreasonable, even 
though the statutory authorization did not require cost-benefit analysis. 
Nonetheless, Scalia found such a requirement to be implicit in the statute: 
“Read naturally in the present context, the phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ 
requires at least some attention to cost.”159 Regulation, Scalia opined, could not 
be appropriate where annual benefits on the order of $5 million were offset by 
costs of nearly $10 billion.160 
Well, that sounds right, does it not? It does, and therefore it should come 
as no surprise that Scalia’s description of the EPA’s action was grossly 
misleading. Just after expressing incredulity that the agency would impose 
“costs to power plants . . . between 1,600 and 2,400 times as great as the 
quantifiable benefits from reduced emissions of hazardous air pollutants,”161 
Scalia’s majority opinion acknowledges that the EPA also estimated 
                                               
155 Id. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
156 See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224–28 (1988) 
(describing, inter alia, the substantially looser restrictions on permissible lawsuits prior 
to the twentieth century); id. at 224 (“no general doctrine of standing existed” before 
modern times). 
157 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015). 
158 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
159 135 S.Ct at 2707. 
160 Id. at 2705–06. 
161 Id. at 2706. 
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quantifiable ancillary benefits of $37 billion to $90 billion per year.”162 He 
deemed those benefits ineligible for inclusion in an L&E-style cost-benefit 
computation, however, because the EPA did not take account of them “in its 
appropriate-and-necessary finding.”163 
In dissent, Justice Kagan criticized the majority for nit-picking. The 
EPA did take costs into account, finding “that the quantifiable benefits of its 
regulation would exceed the costs up to nine times over.”164 Kagan questioned 
why the majority thought that EPA was required to “explicitly analyze costs at 
the very first stage of the regulatory process,” given that it “later took costs 
into account again and again.”165 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Michigan v. EPA illustrates two critical 
points, one about O&T, the other about L&E. First, to the extent that an O&T-
oriented judge thinks it is almost always easy to reconcile O&T with L&E by 
pointing to enacted language that can somehow be read to authorize or 
command L&E, the claim undermines the supposed objectivity, determinacy, 
and neutrality of O&T. Statutory language like “appropriate and necessary” 
does not rule out cost-benefit analysis, but it hardly commands such analysis. 
And yet Scalia nonetheless saw in the text a clear mandate for cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Second, and as we demonstrated as a theoretical matter in Part II, L&E 
itself—including cost-benefit analysis—is often indeterminate.166 What counts 
as a cost that must be included in the analysis? Which costs can be ignored, 
and how do we draw the line? And how should we account for the same open-
ended vagueness on the benefits side of the ledger? In Michigan, the ancillary 
benefits that EPA considered after the initial stage of its regulatory process 
included reductions in emissions of harmful pollutants that were not 
themselves the legal basis for regulation.167 Does that render them ineligible? 
The statute—which we do well to recall did not expressly require cost-benefit 
analysis at all—was silent on what benefits count, leaving the Justices to fall 
back on the sorts of contestable and contested intuitions about what counts 
(and, perhaps equally importantly, what does not) that bedevil economists’ 
efforts to measure costs and benefits more broadly. 
                                               
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. 
166 We develop this point further in Part V. 
167 See id. at 2706 (opinion of the Court) (noting that the EPA claimed its “regulations 
would have ancillary benefits—including cutting power plants’ emissions of particulate 
matter and sulfur dioxide, substances that are not covered by the hazardous-air-
pollutants program.”). 
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 Accordingly, we are happy to cite Michigan v. EPA as vindicating our 
concerns about both O&T and L&E. However, we have included this case and 
the other environmental cases in our discussion here chiefly for a simpler and 
more limited purpose: to show that even Scalia—who was much less closely 
associated with L&E than Bork or Easterbrook—nonetheless was happy to 
apply at least a crude form of economics without an express statutory mandate 
to do so. Antitrust was not a special exception to textualism for Scalia any more 
than it was for other, more expressly L&E-driven jurists. 
 
C.  Another Alternative Reconciliation: Public Choice Theory 
 
To recap the argument of this Part to this point, if O&T and L&E were 
as neutral, objective, and determinate as their proponents claim, then: (1) we 
ought to see much more intra-conservative open conflict between O&T and 
L&E than we in fact observe; (2) given that O&T, as the interpretive 
methodology, is more fundamental than L&E, O&T ought to win in such 
conflicts; (3) to be sure, O&T could command the application of L&E principles 
in particular circumstances, and under such circumstances the application of 
L&E would be consistent with O&T; (4) but we see jurists who are ostensibly 
committed to O&T routinely applying L&E principles based on very weak to 
nonexistent evidence that O&T authorizes L&E; and so we are left to conclude 
either that (5) jurists who claim fealty to O&T are dissembling (perhaps even 
to themselves); or that (6) O&T lacks anything like the constraining force that 
its proponents claim. 
Perhaps, however, we have overstated the case. Maybe there is an 
alternative means of resolving or suppressing the potential conflict between 
O&T and L&E. What if step (3) of the foregoing summary states only one such 
means? Could there be another, more effective means for avoiding the conflict? 
 Consider a 2014 speech168 by Todd Zywicki, who began by remarking on 
the fact that most of his fellow conservatives assume that L&E and O&T are 
not just compatible but complementary. He then challenged that assumption. 
It is “kind of taken for granted within the Federalist Society coalition that 
there is a natural alliance between constitutional originalism and law 
and economics,” Zywicki said, “but it’s not obvious that that necessarily is the 
case.”169 Rather than explain that his audience might have to forgo one or the 
other commitment, however, Zywicki went on to try to reconcile them. He did 
not do so in the manner we have been discussing so far, that is, by arguing that 
through some happy coincidence O&T typically directs judges to apply L&E.  
                                               
168 See Todd J. Zywicki, Is There a George Mason School of Law and Economics?, 10 J. L., 
ECON. & POL’Y 543 (2014). 
169 Id. at 551. 
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Instead, Zywicki argued that the L&E and O&T are “sympathetic 
intellectual traditions” by formulating institutional arguments thought to 
justify O&T as an application of economic analysis to politics. He said 
“that taking economics and applying it to everyone in the political system 
makes much more prominent the potential for agency costs with judges, and 
that they’re using their powers to read their views into law.”170 
Zywicki hardly pioneered the notion of conceptualizing politics as a 
subset of economics. In modern times, that idea is most closely associated with 
James Buchanan171 and the field of public choice theory his work spawned. 
Accordingly, Zywicki favorably cites Buchanan’s critical 1974 review of 
Richard Posner’s landmark L&E book, Economic Analysis of Law.172 There, 
Buchanan lauded Posner for his generally competent application of economic 
analysis to particular legal questions but questioned the methodology writ 
large. A conventional economist, Buchanan accepted that efficiency is an 
objective concept, but he did question Posner’s assumption that the law 
requires efficiency. Buchanan offered a thought experiment in which no 
antitrust legislation exists. He then said that a Posnerian judge would have 
warrant to “outlaw monopoly” as inefficient but that this result is plainly 
wrong because in so doing “he would be explicitly abandoning his role of jurist 
for that of legislator.”173 
Yet far from reconciling L&E with O&T, Buchanan’s critique of Posner 
sharpens the conflict. We can see the point most clearly by noting how public 
choice theory figures into the argument for textualism. Easterbrook pithily put 
the point in a short but influential essay.174 Claiming to draw lessons “from the 
                                               
170 Id. 
171 So far as we are aware, James Buchanan is not a relative of the co-author of this article 
with the same surname. 
172 See Zywicki, supra note 168, at 552 (citing James M. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad 
Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483 (1974) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW (1st ed. 1973)). For his part, Posner is a lone exception to the proposition that 
conservative jurists have either failed even to recognize or failed to successfully reconcile 
the conflict between O&T and L&E. As he matured, Posner’s commitment to L&E 
broadened into a general commitment to pragmatism and he became less conservative, 
but he never endorsed O&T. On the contrary, he critiqued it relentlessly. See, e.g., Richard 
A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUB. (Aug. 24, 2012), available at 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism 
(reviewing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 12) (offering numerous criticisms, including the 
observation that despite its claims to objectivity, determinacy, and neutrality, “textual 
originalism” as defended by Scalia and Garner, “provide[s] them with all the room needed 
to generate the outcome that favors Justice Scalia’s strongly felt views on such matters as 
abortion, homosexuality, illegal immigration, states’ rights, the death penalty, and guns.”) 
173 Buchanan, supra note 172, at 490. 
174 Easterbrook, supra note 57. 
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discoveries of public choice theory,”175 he disclaimed a gap-filling role for 
judges: “The legislature ordinarily would rebuff any suggestion that judges be 
authorized to fill in blanks in the ‘spirit’ of the compromise. Most compromises 
lack ‘spirit,’ and in any event one part of the deal is to limit the number of 
blanks to be filled in.”176 
The upshot of public choice theory is not L&E. If judges lack authority 
to fill gaps, they lack authority to fill gaps with L&E. True, Easterbrook’s 
prescription is anti-regulatory; he argues that in many circumstances, 
statutory silence should be treated as meaning that the law has no application, 
leaving the parties to resort to a form of potentially chaotic behavior that has 
come to be justified by dubbing it “market ordering.”177 But while Easterbrook’s 
proposal may reflect his anti-regulatory priors, it still does not purport to 
derive L&E from O&T. As Buchanan’s critique of Posner indicates, application 
of economic analysis to the legislature itself—that is, public choice theory—can 
be used to derive textualism; it does not in any way mitigate the potential for 
conflict between L&E and O&T. 
 
V.  Why Do Liberal Scholars and Judges Not Exploit the Open-Ended 
Nature of O&T or L&E for Their Own Purposes? 
 
Thus far, we have argued that there is no objective, non-normative, or 
scientific basis on which neoclassical economists can base their analyses; our 
argument necessarily undermines similar claims by Law & Economics 
scholars, who rely on the neoclassical approach. Similarly, having reviewed 
arguments that are somewhat more widely known among legal scholars than 
the critique of L&E, we have shown that the Originalism & Textualism 
approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation is fundamentally 
manipulable and does not live up to the claims of those who insist that O&T 
meaningfully constrains the subjective choices of jurists and scholars in ways 
that Living Constitutionalism and purposivism supposedly do not. 
This, in turn means that both the L&E and O&T approaches to legal 
and policy analysis inherently embody (usually unstated) moral and 
                                               
175 Id. at 547. 
176 Id. at 540. 
177 See id. at 542 (proposing a “rule of no-application” where a statute leaves a blank). We 
acknowledge that those who use the term market ordering rely on Adam Smith’s metaphor 
of the invisible hand to defend themselves against the claim that market interactions are 
ad hoc and not reliably stable. Even that is probably an overstatement. In any event, 
“market ordering” cannot mean that whatever happens in a market—a market that, per 
our discussion in Part II above, facilitates transactions using whatever baseline of laws 
that happen to exist at any given moment—is the best we can do in the absence of laws to 
the contrary. There are laws, just not the ones that Easterbrook thinks should exist. There 
is no statutory silence. 
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philosophical priors that are no less contestable than the competing priors that 
the adherents to those approaches disparage as being based on mere opinion 
or sentiment. 
Our goal here, however, is not merely to point out that these two 
jurisprudential approaches make similar claims to objectivity that do not 
withstand scrutiny. We argued further in Part IV that there is nothing within 
the L&E and O&T approaches that would lead one to expect those two 
traditions to lead to similar results in concrete cases. L&E and O&T are both 
formalistic in the sense that they purport to produce results without reference 
to normative considerations, but they rest on very different foundations: some 
version of consequentialism underlies L&E; democratic political theory that is 
often hostile to consequentialism (in, for example, its protection of individual 
rights) underwrites O&T; thus, one would expect them to reach similar 
conclusions on any particular question only by occasional happenstance. 
Instead, conservative legal elites have adopted both of these approaches 
and use them in ways that surprisingly—even suspiciously—lead to consistent 
conclusions. We believe that this fact confirms the suspicion that both 
approaches are manipulable and that the scholars who use them manipulate 
their analyses in ways that support—and strategically obscure—their own 
political agendas. 
If we are right, we are left with a mystery: why is this a one-sided game? 
If both economic analysis and legal interpretation are in deeply similar ways 
open to motivated manipulation, why do we not see a mirror image of that 
strategy among the opponents of the conservative movement? 
After all, what counts as the American left178 is, like any political 
coalition, composed of groups whose interests are often at odds. Just as the 
conservative movement papers over an uneasy truce between, on one hand, 
religiously inspired social conservatives opposed to legal abortion, LGBTQ 
rights, and changing gender roles more broadly, and, on the other hand, 
libertarians who believe the government should leave personal moral decisions 
in the hands of individuals, so American liberals and progressives must 
navigate cleavages between, on one hand, environmentalists concerned about 
global warming and local pollution, and, on the other hand, workers who side 
with their employers in worrying that “excessive” regulation will reduce job 
opportunities, among many other examples of uneasy truces within their 
coalition. 
Given that the left, like the right, might feel the need to find ways to 
square certain circles, the availability of fully manipulable theories—theories 
that, notwithstanding their open-ended natures, can usefully be promoted for 
                                               
178 We follow the left-right convention here, although we note that by the standard of 
countries to which the U.S. can meaningfully be compared politically, what counts as “left” 
here is at the center of those other countries’ political spectrums. 
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their supposed objectivity (after having been manipulated as needed) —would 
seem to create an irresistible temptation for the political left to copy the right’s 
strategy and construct an impressive-looking edifice that just so happens to 
reach politically pleasing conclusions on a consistent basis. 
To be clear, one of the current authors has indeed publicly suggested 
that the left should follow just this course, at least on economic issues. At a 
conference in 2014,179 and in a legal analysis essay180 in 2019, that author 
suggested that left-leaning scholars should no longer resist the right’s use of 
the term efficiency and should instead embrace its open-endedness for their 
own ends. Rather than arguing that, say, the non-efficiency values promoted 
by minimum wage laws are worth the supposed efficiency cost, it would be 
“true” (in the same sense that standard efficiency analysis is true, which means 
true under some assumptions but not others) simply to say that minimum 
wages enhance efficiency. 
In both cases, however, this idea was presented not as a serious 
assertion that the left has developed a truly objective approach to put up 
against the right’s objective (but substantively unappealing) approach. 
Instead, the suggestion was tongue in cheek, with the idea that the connotative 
appeal of the word “efficiency” is so strong that liberals might as well embrace 
the incoherence of the efficiency analysis and very consciously mock the idea 
of adapting it to their own uses. 
Yet the American left has not gone even so far as to embrace that kind 
of playful nihilism. Moreover, the left here in the United States (and, as far as 
we are aware, the left elsewhere) has certainly not adopted a serious strategy 
to recast their analyses as being inherently objective and based on certitudes 
untainted by the politics of the moment. Rather than saying, “No, your 
purportedly scientific theory should be replaced by our truly scientific theory,” 
we see opponents of the conservative movement saying something more like 
this: “We should all simply admit that there is no absolutely objective way to 
avoid normative analysis, which will allow us to have an honest conversation 
about what amounts to different ideological commitments.” As we elaborate 
more fully below, when liberals deploy their own versions of L&E or O&T, they 
typically deny that the results are objective, neutral, and fully 
determinative.181 
                                               
179 Neil H. Buchanan, Discussant’s Comments at Conference on Human Rights and Tax 
Law, McGill University, (June 18-20, 2014).  
180 Neil H. Buchanan, Everything Is Both Efficient and Inefficient as a Matter of 
Economics, DORF ON LAW (Jun. 6, 2019), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2019/06/everything-is-
both-efficient-and.html. 
181 As we acknowledged earlier, the so-called Behavioral Law & Economics (BLE) 
movement is arguably in tension with this claim, because there is at least some pretense 
of objectivity to much of the work in that genre. See supra, note 45. Most of the useful 
substance of BLE, however, can be embraced while rejecting claims to objectivity. For 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553508
A Tale of Two Formalisms 
  60 
All of which brings us back to our question. Why have we not seen the 
left adopt this mirror-image approach, saying that everything can be efficient 
if we make the necessary assumptions to get to the conclusions of our choice, 
and then to defend those assumptions as if they are the one and true baseline 
against which efficiency and inefficiency must be measured?182 
Why do we also not see something like that in the left’s response to O&T? 
To be sure, in 2015, Justice Kagan declared “that we’re all textualists now,” 183 
but she did so in the course of a colloquy at Harvard Law School named for and 
in honor of Justice Scalia, and while she was clearly contrasting the newer 
approach to statutory interpretation with the more broadly policy-based 
approach that prevailed prior to Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court, 
she essentially made the same point that, as we observed in Part III, Molot 
had made nearly a decade earlier—namely, that there no longer is a distinctive 
textualist position.184 Indeed, that is exactly what Kagan said, for if we are all 
textualists, then textualism as a distinctive methodology does not exist. More 
importantly for present purposes, Justice Kagan did not claim for textualism 
the sort of objectivity and determinacy that its strongest proponents do. She 
seemed to have in mind the much more modest view of “second-generation 
textualism” defended by Manning (who, as it happened, was interviewing her 
for the colloquy). 
So much for the possibility of result-oriented liberal judging disguised 
as textualism and pretending to objectivity. What about originalism? As we 
                                               
example, noting that people are myopic in many situations that require long-term 
planning need not be paired with a claim that such decisions are inefficient, only that 
those decisions differ from what people would choose if they did not discount the future so 
strongly. 
182 To reiterate, we do not deny that many liberals and progressive judges and legal 
scholars employ what we might call economic tools to advance particular claims—for 
example, that minimum wage laws do not necessarily increase unemployment or that 
insurance markets will collapse if insurers are legally forbidden from screening out clients 
with pre-existing conditions absent compensating mechanisms like government subsidies 
or coverage mandates. We also acknowledge that one can use the term “law and 
economics” sufficiently capaciously to encompass scholarly and judicial output making 
such claims. However, as we are using the term—and consistent with its origins and 
canonical form—L&E makes the further, distinctive, claim that certain outcomes are not 
simply more likely than others to occur given various pre-conditions, but are “efficient” 
and thus preferred, all the while hiding the assumptions that go into specifying the 
baseline against which to measure efficiency. 
183 Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena 
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. The statement occurs at 8:30 in the 
video. 
184 See supra, text accompanying notes 80-81. 
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observed in Part III, some noted liberal constitutional scholars have argued 
that semantic originalism is, in Ronald Dworkin’s phrase, “innocuous,” or, as 
David Strauss and Jack Balkin (each separately) argued, indistinguishable 
from Living Constitutionalism.185 But none of these scholars was engaged in 
an effort to develop an originalism of the left in the sense of a methodology that 
claims objectivity and determinacy for left/liberal results. On the contrary, by 
equating semantic originalism with Living Constitutionalism, the left/liberal 
scholars were following the nearly opposite course that typifies left/liberal 
scholarship about both L&E and O&T: characterizing the authoritative text as 
open-ended and thus an invitation to engage in frankly normative reasoning. 
Perhaps the closest thing one sees to liberal originalism are dissents by 
liberal-leaning justices responding to originalist arguments by conservatives. 
The dissent of Justice Stevens in District of Columbia v. Heller186 falls into this 
category.187 So do the key dissents of Justice Souter from the Rehnquist Court’s 
state sovereign immunity rulings.188 But these are essentially exercises in 
counter-punching. The conservative majority claims a historical mandate for 
its result, so the liberal justices offer an alternative historical account that 
undercuts the majority’s narrative. One does not come away from such dissents 
thinking that the liberal justices are committed originalists. Indeed, the last 
justice to sit on the Court who could be said to be a liberal originalist was Hugo 
Black,189 who died nearly five decades ago. 
 
                                               
185 See supra, text accompanying notes 86-88. 
186 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
187 See id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Neither the text of the [Second] Amendment 
nor the arguments advanced by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting 
any legislature's authority to regulate private civilian uses of firearms. Specifically, there 
is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-
law right of self-defense in the Constitution.”). 
188 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
189 See Michael Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices 
Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994). By today’s standards, Black is not clearly a 
liberal. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).  
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A.  Is the Baseline Problem Too Abstract? 
 
Why do scholars and jurists who are not slavishly committed to either 
of the two formalisms discussed above not copy their opponents’ approach and 
claim objectivity—objectivity that is, to restate our fundamental starting point, 
an illusion? The influence of O&T and L&E cannot be denied, and even if 
imitation is not the highest form of flattery, nothing succeeds like success. 
Learning from successful strategies and acting accordingly would seem to be a 
wise response. Let us consider some possibilities with respect to both O&T and 
L&E, beginning with the latter. 
Perhaps liberals have (consciously or not) avoided the if-you-can’t-beat-
’em-join-’em approach because it would simply be too difficult to tear down 
conservatives’ intellectual L&E infrastructure and rebuild to serve their own 
purposes. Constructing economic models based on different baselines is neither 
simple nor easy, and given that any such model would not truly be any more 
objective than the current approach (but again, no less objective, either), 
maybe it is simply not worth it. 
After all, in this Article we needed more than six thousand words simply 
to describe the baseline problem in economics. Explaining why it is legitimate 
to use a different baseline and then building a model based on one among an 
infinite number of possible baselines (and justifying that baseline) would be a 
daunting task indeed. 
That explanation, however, seems to us not to capture the nature of the 
scholarly enterprise. It is true that any particular piece of scholarship must be 
written by making choices about what to include and exclude, taking into 
account the intended audience, the permitted length, and so on. However, the 
L&E movement, like all successful academic enterprises, gains strength from 
the fact that so many scholars have become engaged with it. It is not literally 
true that there is an unlimited supply of scholars’ time available to devote to 
any particular project, but there is surely no shortage of people who could 
happily build successful careers pursuing the various paths onto which 
something called “objective liberalism”190 might guide them. Liberal judges 
and justices could then cite whatever subset of the voluminous scholarly 
literature assisted in giving their work a patina of objectivity. 
It is in some sense even more surprising, then, that this alternative path 
has not become popular among jurists or up-and-coming academics with 
training in economics. It is true that some fields (such as economics itself) have 
seen the dominant theorists “lock up” the top journals and deny prestigious 
placements to scholarship that challenges the orthodoxy, but that is currently 
                                               
190 We coin this term here simply to demonstrate that there would be a banner behind 
which a supposedly objective anti-L&E movement could march. So far as we know, this 
term does not exist in the literature. 
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not a problem for judges or even in legal scholarship, or at least it is less of a 
problem than elsewhere. 
More plausibly, because the alternative that we are describing—but not 
endorsing, even though this hypothetical alternative would by assumption be 
built to comport with our own policy and philosophical views—can lead 
scholars to rely upon advanced mathematics, there might be a mismatch of 
expertise among the editors of the journals that dominate the legal field. 
Although the students who edit the top legal journals are quite talented, it is 
hardly a secret that many of them openly disparage mathematical and 
economic approaches. 
But some law students are, in fact, quite well trained in advanced 
economics and mathematics. True, those students who do have some economics 
or L&E education have generally been trained in the neoclassical orthodoxy 
that we are critiquing here, which might cause those students to resist 
engaging with articles that challenge that orthodoxy, especially if such a 
challenge could be seen to undermine their feeling that such training was 
useful. 
Note, however, that this phenomenon might cut in the other direction; 
that is, it suggests that law journals could be particularly welcoming places in 
which to publish liberal arguments that purport to be objective. After all, if the 
only move necessary when switching from a conservative to a liberal faux-
objective economic model is to change the assumptions regarding the positions 
of supply and demand curves that constitute the efficient baseline, much of the 
existing mathematical superstructure would be transferable to the newfangled 
liberal alternative. 
Far from making law students with economics training feel that their 
college years were misspent, then, a supposedly objective category of liberal 
economic modeling could make such students feel empowered. It is actually the 
pragmatic approach we endorse that might leave students worried that they 
must throw out the impressive methodological baby with the surreptitiously 
ideological bathwater 
Even though it seems clear that the peer-reviewed top economics 
journals are ideologically unwelcoming to baseline-challenging approaches, 
then, we might expect the top law journals to be particularly comfortable with, 
and perhaps even enthusiastic about, hosting such scholarship. Yet we see few 
if any examples of legal scholars claiming to undermine neoclassical efficiency 
by arguing for different baselines, with most liberals merely content to argue 
(as we noted in Part II) that equity is important, too. 
B.  The Manipulability of Utility Functions 
 
Accordingly, there could be demand (in the law journals) for objective 
liberalism in L&E. What about supply (from scholars)? We assumed above that 
it is a formidable task to build and publish a new economic model from the 
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ground up using a full set of legal rules that constitute a new baseline. While 
that is true, it falls short of explaining why liberals have not responded to 
conservatives’ pseudo-objective theories in a more targeted way that does not 
require a fully worked-out alternative model. 
Our discussion in Part II above cast the analysis in terms of the familiar 
supply and demand curves seen in basic undergraduate economics courses. The 
neoclassical approach to economics, however, derives those supply and demand 
curves mathematically from utility functions, which might be easier to 
manipulate and thus use opportunistically.191 
Utility functions are general mathematical expressions that describe 
how much happiness, wellbeing, or other generalized good described somewhat 
delphically as “utility” an individual derives from various inputs.192 The 
standard approach to deriving demand curves posits that individuals try to 
maximize their utility by buying quantities of some good in response to the 
good’s price, to the prices of other goods (substitutes and complements), to one’s 
income, and to one’s subjective taste for the good. Making basic assumptions 
about whether each variable increases or decreases utility,193 such as the 
standard belief that people will want to buy smaller quantities of the good (or 
none at all) when the price rises and that increases in the prices of substitute 
goods will increase the quantity demanded of the good in question, economists 
can derive not only where the curve lies on a price-versus-quantity graph but 
how the demand curve will move on that graph when other variables change. 
One standard challenge to the utility-based approach, however, involves 
observing situations in which a person’s behavior does not comport with what 
we thought we knew about rationally maximizing behavior. For example, the 
renowned conservative economist Milton Friedman long ago argued that a 
laissez-faire approach even to the existence of racial and gender discrimination 
would be better than supposedly heavy-handed (and inefficient) laws 
guaranteeing civil rights, because a profit-maximizing business owner would 
shrewdly see that her bigoted competitors were under-demanding talented 
                                               
191 Utility maximization underlies both supply and demand curves, but supply curves are 
often described as having been derived from “production functions.” That relabeling is 
based on the idea that businesses are trying to maximize profits rather than utility itself. 
As we discuss below, however, this is ultimately a utility-based analysis, and it is no less 
subject to manipulation than any other kind of utility analysis. 
192 Although there is much to say about the prospect of measuring utility (or even defining 
the unit of measurement), we are satisfied here to accept the standard approach in which 
utility curves could be useful to describe ordinal, rather than cardinal, comparison. That 
is, even if it might mean nothing to describe a person as enjoying “6 utils of happiness” in 
one situation and “4 utils of happiness” in another, there is analytical power in saying that 
the first is preferable to the other, without quantifying the difference. 
193 Mathematically, this involves making assumptions about whether partial derivatives 
of the utility function are positive or negative. 
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workers.194 This would allow the enlightened owner to drive unenlightened 
owners out of business. 
If Friedman’s analysis were correct, however, one would have to ask how 
long it takes for markets to work their sleight of (invisible) hand, with the raw 
pursuit of profit among capitalists making bigotry in the workplace a thing of 
the past. After all, when Friedman was making these arguments, it had been 
a century since emancipation and decades since women had gained the right 
to vote, yet Jim Crow showed no signs of weakening and even Harvard Law 
School’s dean was asking female students to justify why they were taking seats 
away from men with families to feed.195 
One possibility is that unregulated labor markets would eventually lead 
to the end of invidious discrimination, but one must be patient. That 
explanation, however, runs up against  a practical objection along with a 
theoretical one. The practical objection is simply that, if a process can take 
literally decades to end a social ill, then that is no solution at all (or at least, 
any other objections to government intervention would need to be even 
stronger to overcome the accumulation of years of harm while the market 
works its magic). 
The theoretical objection is internal to Friedman’s theory: if one takes 
his approach seriously, there is nothing to explain even a short time lag. 
Indeed, what is now known among economists as “super-neutrality” holds not 
just that markets should reach equilibrium at some point but that they will do 
so all but instantaneously. This is because every moment of delay is an 
unexploited profit-maximizing opportunity. If employers had no other reason 
to discriminate, they would aggressively recruit the best talent immediately, 
not after years or even decades of waiting for something to happen. 
In response to this problem, another prominent conservative economist 
offered what can be thought of as a friendly amendment to Friedman’s theory—
friendly in intent, that is, but actually fatal. The amendment is Gary Becker’s 
notion of the “taste for discrimination.”196 Becker explained that employers 
have utility functions (because they are human beings), and just as people have 
a taste for vanilla versus chocolate (about which the government should have 
no opinion, and should certainly take no action), they might also find a 
                                               
194 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 32 (Sept. 13, 1970). Richard Epstein later made the same 
point. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
195 See Ira E. Stoll, Ginsburg Blasts Harvard Law, The Harvard Crimson (Jul. 23, 1993), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1993/7/23/ginsburg-blasts-harvard-law-pin-
testimony/. 
196 See, e.g., David H. Autor, The Economics of Discrimination-Theory, 
ECONOMICS.MIT.EDU (Nov. 24, 2003), https://economics.mit.edu/files/553. 
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“disamenity value”197 to employing people whom they find unpleasant to be 
around for any reason (including race or sex). 
The point of Becker’s exercise was to show that the model of profit-
maximization and efficient competition can withstand the objection that 
employers choose to reduce their profits below what they might earn, simply 
because the employers’ utility functions apparently include tastes that are (we 
hope) nonstandard. They are still maximizing, this explanation tells us, but 
they are maximizing over a different set of variables than a less realistic 
version of the model might have predicted.198 
Becker’s bottom line, then, is not that there is no such thing as efficiency 
(or that markets do not reach efficient outcomes) but that efficiency is a more 
complicated optimizing process than we might initially believe.199 Becker (in 
an article co-authored with Judge Richard Posner) later even went so far as to 
prove (as a mathematical proposition) that suicide is rational and efficient,200 
demonstrating that he was willing to push his framework to the limit of 
plausibility or decency. 
More generally, however, the very power of the utility-based approach—
in particular, the claim that one can respond to any objection to utility-based 
conclusions simply by reimagining what people include in their utility 
functions—is in fact its Achilles heel. If every objection can be overcome by 
adding explanatory variables ex post, then this is not a scientific enterprise, 
because the theory is not falsifiable. 
How do we explain, for example, why people who are trying to maximize 
utility (generally thought of as at least a rough synonym for happiness) 
nonetheless engage in activities that are grueling, painful, and difficult—such 
as running marathons? The tautological response is obvious. Such people (and 
thus their utility functions) must clearly derive value from being physically fit 
                                               
197 Id. at 3. 
198 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response 
to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1583 (1998) (arguing that “rational 
choice theorists [coextensive here with believers in the neoclassical utility-based 
approach] will inevitably be perfectly reasonable in believing that many [modifications of 
utility functions] can be interpreted as consistent with their paradigm.”). 
199 Some levels of complexity are welcome into the theory, but others are not. In the latter 
category, even the most sophisticated models generally rule out “interdependent utility 
functions,” in which one of the variables that Person A takes into account in maximizing 
her utility is Person B’s utility. Even though it is entirely imaginable, even normal, for 
people to care about each other’s wellbeing, modeling such interactions has proven an 
insurmountable mathematical obstacle to making the approach realistic in this way. 
200 See Gary S. Becker & Richard A. Posner, Suicide: An Economic Approach 9 (Aug. 24, 
2004), available at https://www.gwern.net/docs/psychology/2004-becker.pdf (describing 
suicide as rational for “people who are depressed and are highly inefficient at extracting 
utility from their situations”). 
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or even simply from the satisfaction of having engaged in demanding activities. 
Per Becker, they might even be masochists, whose subjective pleasures a 
neutral science should not judge. 
The problem, however, is not merely that this method of defending 
utility theory is unbounded. It is that believers in neoclassical economics 
(including L&E scholars) appear not truly to believe that their theory is as 
open-ended as they claim when they are obligated to talk their way around its 
inconvenient implications. 
Consider a somewhat unusual example. For nearly a century, Finland 
has issued “day-fines” keyed not only to the severity of the offense but also to 
ability to pay. Day-fines can be justified on fairness as well as deterrence 
grounds. A very wealthy Finn would disregard a fine for speeding on the 
highway if subject only to the same size fine as a middle-class Finn. Finland’s 
day-fines for traffic offenses gained notoriety in the early 2000s when the 
disparities grew due to the sudden riches of some employees of Nokia, leading 
to a traffic ticket for over $100,000.201  
One of the authors of the present paper witnessed an exchange between 
a neoclassical economist and a law student. The economist said that Finland’s 
system of fines was inefficient, because the disutility that speeding caused 
(dangers to others, damage to roads, and so on) was related to specific speeds 
and not to the income or wealth of the speeders. The law student responded 
that Finns apparently had a “taste for equality”—at least on the roads—and 
thus the new system of fines accurately reflected the Finnish social utility 
function. 
If one were to take seriously the claims that utility theory is powerful 
because utility functions can include anything at all among their explanatory 
variables, this student’s response would seem to be unobjectionable, albeit a 
bit counterintuitive. Indeed, the student might have been commended for 
applying the insight that utility functions can take any form. Instead, the 
economist firmly rejected the very idea that the Finnish fines could be 
rationalized in this way. The real cost to society, he insisted, was still unrelated 
to income. But this insistence, of course, merely meant that he rejected the 
idea—as a normative matter—that inequality matters, at least in this context. 
We need not venture a guess as to whether that particular economist is 
in any way typical of all economists. Instead, we need only point out that his 
fundamental objection—that utility maximization must have boundaries in 
order to be useful—is exactly the point. He might or might not be able to make 
a good case to exclude wealth or income when setting speeding fines, but any 
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such case must perforce involve arbitrary, normative, and thus unscientific 
decisions about the scope of the inquiry. 
Beyond the particulars of the examples above, our point is that utility 
theory is typically held out to make neoclassical theory infinitely adaptable. 
We stipulated above that the supply-and-demand approach and the utility-
maximization approach are mathematically identical, which means that the 
utility-based approach is equally incoherent due to the baseline problem. We 
have taken the time here to explain the utility-based approach, however, to 
demonstrate that one need not rebuild an entire theoretical infrastructure to 
reverse the seemingly inexorable conservative results of neoclassical analysis. 
 
C.  Beyond the Manipulability of Originalism and Textualism 
 
The foregoing conclusion implies that our summary in Part III of the 
manipulability of originalism and textualism is analogous to this critique of 
utility theory in precisely the way that it is analogous to the baseline problem. 
In all cases, a move toward generality at first seems to open up space for the 
theory to have more explanatory and policy-relevant power; yet that move 
ultimately proves too much, and the only way to save the theory is to retreat 
to a less general fallback (a fallback that had been rejected previously when 
the narrower approach became inconvenient). 
Thus, for example, we find neoclassical economists switching back and 
forth from the capacious version of a utility function (for example, including 
“justice” in the utility function) and the crabbed version (objecting that justice 
or wealth are insufficiently important to include in a utility function), 
depending on what they wish to prove. 
Similarly, we find O&T theorists claiming to embrace original meaning 
at a high level of generality (rejecting intentions-and-expectations originalism 
in favor of the substantially less determinate public-meaning version) in order 
to disavow results that are beyond the pale politically, such as the conclusion 
that de jure racial segregation is constitutional,  but then saying the equivalent 
of abortion is not a fundamental right because James Madison would have not 
have thought it to be one or that the members of Congress that approved the 
Fourteenth Amendment would never have imagined that they were giving 
equal protection to LGBTQ individuals.202 Just as there is a similarity in the 
way that O&T and L&E theorists move fluidly between unbounded generality 
and arbitrary specificity, there is more than a bit of overlap in the way that 
these theorists often respond to objections to their fundamental methods. 
                                               
202 One of the current authors previously gave the example of Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011), explaining that despite 
purporting to engage in semantic originalism, the only evidence Thomas provided 
concerned the “practices and beliefs held by the Founders,” which is a form of intentions-
and-expectations originalism. Dorf, supra note 92, at 2023. 
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When confronted with objections to the idea of modeling people as 
rationally maximizing their utility functions (responding to prices and other 
facts about the world to reach an objectively efficient outcome), neoclassical 
economists might disparage any such objection by saying, “so you don’t think 
that people respond to prices?” This response, of course, misses the point. The 
shortcoming in efficiency analysis is not in believing that people respond to 
relevant information but in calling the results of people’s decisions efficient or 
inefficient. Describing whether and how people respond to incentives poses a 
predictive question, and it need have nothing to do with assessing efficiency. 
The analogous move in the O&T realm might be to ask incredulously: 
“are you saying that you don’t think the text matters?” Of course the text 
matters, and one might even go so far as to say, as Justice Kagan said in the 
colloquy we described above, that Justice Scalia and other self-described 
textualists deserve credit for reminding us all of that fact. But in the contested 
cases in which the choice of interpretive method might be thought to matter, 
neither originalism nor textualism derives objective meaning unmediated by 
the interpreter’s priors, just as describing people as rational cannot overcome 
the inherent subjectivity of how efficiency is defined. 
So why don’t liberals play this game too? As we noted above, one 
occasionally sees a liberal-leaning justice making historical arguments to 
counter conservatives’ originalist claims, but that is hardly the same thing as 
saying something like “the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
properly understood, clearly requires recognition of a constitutional right to 
abortion, and anyone who disagrees is not actually engaged in interpretation.” 
Only such a claim to objectivity and determinacy would be a parallel move to 
the sorts of claims that originalists and textualists make. 
Just as we acknowledge that there are liberal scholars and judges who 
deploy economic tools but do not brand their results objective in the way that 
conservative practitioners of L&E do, so we acknowledge that there is a 
substantial body of what might be considered liberal originalist scholarship. 
However, like the liberal originalist judging we described above, liberal 
originalist scholarship is mostly a form of counterpunching—or worse. What 
might be called liberal originalist scholarship falls into four broad categories, 
each problematic in its own way. 
First, as we noted above, scholars like Balkin, Dworkin, and Strauss 
sometimes argue that originalism conceived as original public meaning is no 
different from Living Constitutionalism and then proceed to make arguments 
that thus could be understood as consistent with original meaning. However, 
by framing public meaning originalism as indistinguishable from Living 
Constitutionalism, such scholars essentially advertise that they do not claim 
to have discovered the single objective truth. 
Second, historians who write about legal issues and happen to be 
left/liberal often discuss questions that concern original meaning. This 
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category includes excellent work by Mary Bilder,203 Jack Rakove,204 Saul 
Cornell,205 and many others. Yet because even non-originalists care about 
original meaning as a factor in constitutional interpretation,206 historical 
scholarship that bears on original meaning is not necessarily originalist. 
Moreover, good historians try to avoid presentism; they acknowledge that one 
can never encounter the past directly and unmediated by our knowledge of the 
present but do not look to the past to answer questions that reflect our own 
concerns rather than those of the earlier period;207 and more often than not 
they find that a finer grained understanding of the past yields greater 
complexity and ambiguity, not certainty. Accordingly, historical scholarship 
that is not simply law office history208 actually undercuts the case for 
originalism; it is not a species of originalism, liberal or otherwise. 
Third, some generally conservative self-styled originalists engage in 
what might be described as intermittently or opportunistic liberal originalism. 
Michael McConnell’s well-known article purporting to show that Brown v. 
Board of Education was consistent with equal protection not only in a semantic 
sense but in accordance with the intentions and expectations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers209 is perhaps the leading example of this genre. The 
effort by Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert to reconcile the modern sex 
discrimination case law with the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment210 (which, we do well to recall, introduced a sex line into the 
                                               
203 See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (2015) (detailing how James Madison repeatedly revised his notes of the 
Constitutional Convention).  
204 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1996). 
205 See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2008). 
206 See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The 
Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J 1766, 1767 (1997). 
207 See RAKOVE, supra note 204, at xv (seeking to avoid “a presentist skewing” as the 
framers and ratifiers “would not have denied themselves the benefit of testing their 
original ideas and hopes against the intervening experience . . . since 1789.”). 
208 See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 554 (1995) (“legal scholars, in what in its worst form is dubbed ‘law 
office history,’ notoriously pick and choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that 
serve their purposes.”). 
209 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1995). 
210 See Steven G. Calabresi and Julia Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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Constitution for the first time211) is another example. Whatever the merits of 
these and similar articles,212 they do not practice liberal originalism in the 
sense of harnessing originalism’s spurious claims to objectivity and neutrality 
to liberal ends. On the contrary, conservatives like McConnell, Calabresi, and 
others try to derive canonical liberal results in an apparent effort to prove the 
supposed apoliticism—and thus bolster the credibility—of originalism so that 
it can be invoked more commonly for conservative results. These are ultimately 
just more sophisticated examples of Bork’s “confirmation conversion.” 
Fourth and finally, there may be a few true believers in the relative 
determinacy and objectivity of original meaning who use it to produce 
whatever results it happens to produce, including liberal ones on occasion. 
Akhil Amar is probably the leading exemplar of this approach,213 which uses 
history and what Amar calls intratextualism214 to derive more determinate 
meaning from the constitutional text than most other scholars find. Perhaps if 
there were a great many more scholars like Amar who appear to be 
ideologically eclectic, he could serve as a model of, if not exactly liberal 
originalism, then perhaps something like neutral originalism. However, 
because the text and original understanding in fact lack the kind of 
constraining force that Amar seems to think they have (for the reasons we 
                                               
211 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2 (imposing representation penalty for 
disenfranchisement of “male citizens”). 
212 McConnell’s article, being the best known in this genre, has received the most scrutiny. 
It does not withstand that scrutiny. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and 
Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1882 
(1995) (arguing that despite making “an important contribution to our understanding of 
congressional attitudes toward school segregation in the 1870s,” McConnell “fails to show 
either that Brown is correct on originalist grounds, or even, as he more modestly claims, 
that Brown is within the legitimate range of interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—
As Perceived by Michael McConnell, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 242, 248–59 (1996) recounting the 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2342 
(1995) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-
1910 (1993) (arguing that the prevailing view in 1868 or even considerably later was that 
segregation was legally permissible)); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions—A Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 228 (1996) 
(concluding that “a direct constitutional attack on segregated schools was unthinkable in 
the period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, passed, and ratified.”). 
213 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2006). 
214 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 757 (1999) (describing 
intratextualism as a method in which the reader infers meaning from how repeated words 
and phrases in the Constitution are used in different contexts). 
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discussed in Part III), we think that the eclecticism one sees in Amar’s work 
reflects the fact that his priors are eclectic. In any event, even if we are 
mistaken (or uncharitable) in characterizing Amar in this way, he is not a 
liberal originalist. 
Thus, none of the seeming candidates for a liberal originalism satisfies 
our search for a mirror image of conservative originalism. We reach the same 
conclusion with respect to textualism in statutory interpretation, despite the 
existence of a school of self-styled “progressive textualism.”215 As we saw in our 
discussion of Justice Kagan’s praise for Justice Scalia, the sort of textualism 
that liberal judges embrace is at best the “second-generation” sort that will not 
fool anyone as an exercise in objectivity and determinacy except in the kinds 
of cases in which it is not needed.216 True liberal O&T—in the sense of a 
methodology that claims for itself the ability to neutrally, objectively, and 
determinately produce liberal results—is as scarce as true liberal L&E.   
* * * 
To return to the question with which we began this Part, we still have 
not offered a full explanation for the notable absence of left-leaning scholars or 
judges adopting a strategy to mirror conservative O&T and L&E theorists’ 
unjustifiable claims to objective neutrality.  We have, however, at least tried 
to rule out some possible explanations. 
To draw an analogy from employment discrimination law, a plaintiff can 
support her claim that her employer acted with discriminatory intent if she is 
able to eliminate explanations other than “I was discriminated against,” even 
if she cannot provide a recording of her employer saying that he fired her 
because he hates women. Ruling out competing explanations narrows the field 
of possible alternatives to the plaintiff’s claimed explanation. 
Here, one possible explanation for liberals’ failure to adopt an approach 
that mirrors (but, again, is actually no better than) that of their ideological 
counterparts—who, to be clear, have had enormous success in advancing their 
ideological agenda—is that liberals are simply unwilling to take up an 
                                               
215 See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Progressive Textualism in Administrative Law, 118 MICH. L. 
REV. ONLINE 134, (2019). Professor Kovacs uses “textualism” to refer both to what we call 
originalism in constitutional interpretation and to what we call textualism in statutory 
interpretation. See id. at 135-37. 
216 And sure enough, the chief example of progressive statutory textualism cited by 
Professor Kovacs is Katie R. Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 63, (2019). See Kovacs, supra note 215 at 135 n.8; id. at 136. Yet Eyer falls 
squarely within the counterpunching camp—warning of the “deceptively neutral—but 
practically pernicious” brand of statutory originalism on offer by conservatives, Eyer, 
supra, at 69, and promotes the version of textualism that is functionally a version of 
rebranded purposivism, as she favorably quotes Justice Kagan’s proclamation that “we’re 
all textualists now.” Id. at 85. 
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approach that is fundamentally dishonest.217 We are, however, aware of no way 
to measure or even compare scholars’ respective honesty, and even if we could, 
we should be quite hesitant to say that one group of scholars is more 
intellectually forthright than another. 
In addition, because we identify with the left side of the spectrum on 
both of these areas of scholarship, we are keenly aware that we are ill suited 
to assess our own degrees of honesty. Like everyone who falls victim to 
motivated thinking, we might well delude ourselves into believing ourselves to 
be uniquely intellectually honest. 
We have, however, considered and tentatively ruled out two alternative 
explanations for liberals’ collective decision not to fight fire with fire. It is not 
that doing so would be too difficult or complicated, nor does it seem likely that 
such scholarship would not “place well” in journals. That does not mean that 
there might not be other innocuous explanations, so it would of course be 
premature to say that liberals as a group are unwilling to be intellectually 
dishonest in these ways. 
After all, liberal scholars and judges are not exactly above opportunistic 
or disingenuous invocation of all ostensibly neutral frameworks. For example, 
during the brief period of liberal ascendancy under the Warren Court, liberal 
judges and scholars tended to dismiss conservatives’ objections to judicial 
activism and disregard for precedent. In recent decades, however, liberal 
judges and scholars have repeatedly lamented conservatives’ disrespect for 
stare decisis. It is difficult to see this turn as reflecting a commitment to 
precedent for its own sake rather than an effort to preserve liberal precedents 
based on their outcome. 
If liberal scholars and judges are not necessarily purer of heart than 
conservatives, why are the former unwilling to make the particular false claims 
of objectivity that L&E and O&T make? The best explanation may be a kind of 
tribalism. 
In a fascinating article presenting the results of an empirical study, 
Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, and Stephen Ansolabehere showed that 
support for originalism was highest among whites, males, older Americans, 
and especially born-again or evangelical Christians.218 Not to put too fine a 
point on it, but originalism coded as “Tea Party voter” during the period the 
data were collected and would code as “Trump supporter” now. We do not know 
of parallel empirical data for “law and economics” or its equivalent, but we 
                                               
217 For a powerful statement of the dangers of overstating the degree to which external 
authority rather than the judge’s own views decide hard cases, see Maggie Gardner, 
Dangerous Citations, ___ N.Y.U. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2020) (“Insisting on 
certainty or constraint where there is in fact ambiguity, uncertainty, and subjective 
induction dangerously obscures judicial choice and the inherently subjective nature of 
judging.”). 
218 See Jamal Greene et al, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 373 (2011). 
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have reason to think that it too codes as politically conservative in a way that 
rules out a full embrace by liberal scholars, judges, and citizens more broadly. 
Whatever the explanation, O&T and L&E scholars reach non-objective 
conclusions using methods that their ideological opponents reject, even though 
those methods are more than pliable enough to be used to reach other 
conclusions. By contrast, scholars and judges who do not subscribe to O&T or 
L&E typically argue that it would be better for everyone to admit the 
fundamentally subjective nature of the inquiry. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
The two schools of legal thought most readily identified in the United 
States as “conservative” are the Law and Economics and the Originalism and 
Textualism approaches. Adherents to both claim that their analyses are 
objective, substantially determinate, and apolitical.  
In this Article, we have shown that the economic theory underlying L&E 
is inherently subjective. That is, the intellectual apparatus that purports to 
determine whether a policy or set of market interactions is efficient or 
inefficient is based on a usually hidden set of assumptions that is no more 
objective than any other set of assumptions. Put starkly, anything and 
everything can be described as both efficient and inefficient, depending upon 
what one determines to be the proper legal baselines that govern and enable 
market interactions.  Although this inherent indeterminacy is known among 
some economists and a few legal scholars, the reality that efficiency is not an 
objective concept is surprising to most scholars. 
Less surprising, we suspect, is the very substantial under-determinacy 
of the O&T methodology, which has been the subject of intense criticism for 
decades. In response, O&T scholars have modified their approach to the point 
that they have lost what little claim to greater determinacy than their rivals 
they might have once possessed.  
We also explained that, given their very different underpinnings and 
prescriptions, L&E and O&T should only randomly reach similar conclusions; 
yet both approaches have been used consistently to advance the goals of the 
American conservative movement. That seems an unlikely coincidence and 
thus provides further evidence of the manipulability of each methodology. 
Finally, we observed that non-conservative scholars and jurists have not 
in general indulged in an intellectual move that could have been quite effective 
for them. Because L&E and O&T provide objective-looking approaches that 
can in fact be adapted to any subjective priors that a scholar or judge might 
have, it would be possible for liberals and progressives to purport to have 
discovered objective theories that quite reliably produce left-leaning results.  
Instead, left-leaning scholars and judges have typically eschewed the 
opportunity to advance pseudo-objective approaches, instead conceding that in 
contested cases that reach appellate courts, there is no fully determinate and 
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objective approach to reaching any conclusion, liberal or otherwise. After 
ruling out alternatives, we concluded by offering a tentative sociological 
explanation for liberals’ collective decision to fight fire with water, not fire. 
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